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Abstract

This case study combines elements of exploration and description to examine
the interaction of growth management and housing affordability within the Dutch
system of spatial planning. In Section I, I introduce the research framework and pose
the central research question: How do planners and policymakers in the Netherlands
conceptualize and manage the relationship between land and housing markets, and
the effects of that relationship on housing affordability? In Section II, I provide an
overview of Dutch spatial planning, focusing on planning and policymaking at the
national and municipal levels, and summarizing the postwar-era “bundled
deconcentration” approach to growth management. Section III covers the economic
and political shifts of the 1980s and early 1990s, a period that marked the end of
“bundled deconcentration” and ushered in the “compact city” approach to spatial
planning. In Section IV, I introduce contemporary issues of land scarcity and housing
supply stagnation and summarize my primary interview findings. In Section V, I
elaborate on my interview findings and discuss the broader perspectives offered by
Dutch planners and economists. Finally, in Section VI, I conclude the case study with
a review of findings, final reflections, and suggestions for future research.
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SECTION I: RESEARCH SETUP
Managing Growth in the Netherlands
Although the term has only recently been adopted in Dutch planning literature,
the people of the Netherlands have arguably been practicing a basic form of growth
management for many centuries. Since the earliest human settlements of the modernday Netherlands, residents of this marshy, low-lying territory have been engaged in a
collective project to maximize the utility of their land. Much of the country’s current
land base—including the entire Randstad conurbation, where the bulk of the national
population resides—lies below sea level, and was rendered habitable only through a
sustained campaign of battles against encroaching waters.1 Communities dug ditches
to drain marshlands, built windmills to pump the ditches, and eventually constructed a
national network of canals for the purpose of water management. The product of this
grand collective effort—dry land—is the nation’s most precious natural resource
(Needham 2007, 21-28).
Land use planners—or spatial planners, as they are known in the
Netherlands—are the modern stewards of the nation’s limited land supply. Building
on a long Dutch tradition of dense settlement, planners have worked since the midtwentieth century to preserve agricultural land and to promote compact urban forms in
the face of rapid national population growth. Modern spatial planning in the
Netherlands is coordinated through an elaborate and muscular system of public
agencies operating at the national, provincial, municipal, and local levels.
As a result of these historic traditions and modern-day planning efforts,
1

urbanized areas in the Netherlands are among the most densely populated on Earth
(Needham 2007, 25). In the year 2000, the Netherlands was home to 16 million
inhabitants residing in a built-up area of 4,799 square kilometers – or just 14.5% of the
nation’s dry land supply. 22,260 square kilometers – or 69% of the nation’s land base
– remained in agricultural use, and 4,835 square kilometers (14.5% of dry land) were
forested or natural areas (Needham 2007, 22).
The wise use of land has historically been a top priority of spatial planning in
the Netherlands. However, modern Dutch planners and policymakers have also
displayed a commitment to principles of tolerance, inclusion, and social justice. In
1901, in an effort to improve living standards in blighted urban areas, the Netherlands
adopted Europe’s first policy of urban renewal (i.e. the Housing Act of 1901). After
the Second World War, principles of tolerance and social inclusion gained new status
in the Netherlands as the foundations of a just society. These principles were quickly
incorporated into the institutions and policies that shaped Dutch cities during an era of
booming postwar urbanization. With massive financial support from the central
government, social housing associations in the Netherlands became the largest and
strongest in Europe, building and maintaining upwards of 50% of the nation’s new
urban housing stock and securing a place for low- and middle-income residents in the
cultural and economic centers of Dutch life. The integration of social housing efforts
with national spatial planning is the subject of Section II.
In light of these efforts to protect open space and promote equitable urban
development, the Netherlands has been recognized as a leader in the field of European
2

growth management (Evers et al 2000; van der Valk 2002). Writing in the mid-1990s,
planning scholar Andreas Faludi argued that, without the term ever appearing in Dutch
literature, national spatial planning in the Netherlands conformed to all the criteria of a
growth management system (Faludi 1994, 493). More recently, Faludi and his coauthors have asserted that the ubiquitous term “spatial planning” (ruimtelijke planning,
in Dutch) is best understood as the Euro-English equivalent to “growth management”
(Evers et al 2000, 8).

Regulatory Growth Management and Housing Prices
In the early 1960s, American citizens and elected officials began to voice deep
concerns regarding the ecological and fiscal impacts of low-density suburban
development. Chief among these concerns were the loss of open space and the threat
to environmentally sensitive lands posed by suburban expansion. To address these
threats and rein in sprawling development, citizens and their representatives enacted
growth management policies “to guide the location, quality, and timing of
development” (Porter 1997, vii).
From Hawaii’s 1961 “quiet revolution” through to the present-day “smart
growth” era, American growth management has taken shape through a wide variety of
policy approaches implemented at local, regional, state, and, to a limited extent,
national levels (Bengston et al 2003, 272; Weitz 1999). The term growth management
can be broadly defined as “a calculated effort by a local government, region, or state to
achieve a balance between natural systems—land, air and water—and residential,
3

commercial, and industrial development” (DeGrove 1991).
One common approach to growth management in the United States is to
redistribute powers and responsibilities related to development within the layers of
government. To counteract the strong tendency for local governments to maximize tax
revenue through development, many growth management policies challenge local
authority over development decisions and re-assign some or all monitoring and
regulatory powers to a regional or state authority (Howell-Moroney 2007, 340). These
higher authorities may mandate or strongly encourage local comprehensive planning
and may review such plans for compliance with broader (state- or region-wide)
planning goals (Weitz 1999). This approach has the potential to bring a broader
geographical context and longer time frame to bear on plans for land use and
development, which otherwise tend to be determined according to local, short-term
priorities.
In addition to this approach of redistributing regulatory powers within the layers
of government, auxiliary growth management measures have been implemented with
great effect (Howell-Moroney 2007). Such auxiliary measures may take many forms,
as evidenced by the typology of growth management policies produced by Bengston et
al (2004).2 Beginning with more than thirty distinct policy types observed across the
United States, the authors classify the universe of growth management by identifying
three basic policy approaches: public acquisition, regulation, and incentives. Viewed
as a whole, the typology reveals an approach to growth management characterized by
consistent objectives—the management of urban growth and the protection of open
4

space—and a diversity of policy tools employed to achieve those objectives (Bengston
et al 2004, 275).
Growth management policies have been credited with a wide variety of positive
outcomes, from rationalizing public authority over development to reviving neglected
urban centers. Most often, the champions of growth management in the United States
point to successes in protecting farmland and increasing development density in builtup areas. But growth management is certainly not without its detractors. During the
1990s and 2000s, critics in the United States called attention to skyrocketing home
prices and argued that growth management policies were partly to blame. This topic
generated countless articles in the academic and popular presses, and at least one
edited volume dedicated to its examination, entitled Growth Management and
Affordable Housing: Do They Conflict? (Downs 2004).
The argument that growth management contributes to the inflation of home
values is advanced most often in reference to regulatory approaches. Examples of
regulatory policies for managing urban growth are provided by Bengston et al (2004),
and include development moratoria, adequate public facility ordinances, greenbelts,
and urban growth boundaries. Put simply, critics of these approaches argue that
excessive regulation of development limits the supply of housing relative to demand,
thereby increasing the cost of homes in areas affected by the policy. This argument,
which is rooted firmly in classical urban economics, suggests that conflicts may exist
between the policy objectives of growth management and affordable housing.3
The case of Portland, Oregon provides a clear example of regulatory growth
5

management and the type of criticism that this approach can generate. In accordance
with statewide land use policies, Portland employs an urban growth boundary (UGB)
to contain the metropolitan region’s peripheral development and protect surrounding
high-value farmland. This policy tool, and the unique regional government which
oversees its implementation, makes Portland a favorite city of the national growth
management community. However, during the 1990s, a sharp increase in area home
prices prompted a close examination of Portland’s housing market and gave rise to a
contentious debate regarding regional growth management policies. Critics alleged
that the UGB’s limitation on the land available for development inflated land and
home prices, thereby threatening the area’s historically affordable cost of living.
According to this argument, limiting urbanizable land increased the value of that land,
causing developers to reduce their housing production or pass increased land costs on
to housing consumers directly. Many planners and other analysts came to the defense
of the UGB, arguing that area home price increases were better explained by a spike in
housing demand driven by population growth, rising wages, and the region’s valuable
natural and urban amenities (Phillips and Goodstein 2000; Dawkins and Nelson 2002)

Land and Housing Markets
Although this debate failed to produce definitive answers regarding the relative
costs and benefits of Portland’s urban growth boundary, one significant point of
consensus did emerge from the discussion. Analysts from all camps tended to agree
that regional regulation of land supply does, in fact, increase the market price for land
6

within the UGB (see, for example, Knaap 1985; Nelson 1985; Nelson 1986).
However, the relationship between the price of land and the average price for
finished housing units is extremely complex. While some simplistic models assume a
1:1 relationship between land and housing markets—leading to dire predictions for
housing affordability in “managed growth” markets—most analysts agree that the
relationship is mediated by a number of intervening variables, many of which are
poorly understood.4
One much-discussed example of an intervening variable between land and
housing markets is that of development density. Citing a tenet of classical urban
economics, some analysts of regulatory growth management have emphasized the
tendency for housing developers to adapt to increased land costs by reducing lot sizes
in order to deliver a finished product with a palatable price tag (Phillips and Goodstein
2000, 336; Nelson and Dawkins 2004). Rising land prices may also encourage a
market shift away from single-family residences in favor of higher density alternatives
such as multi-family units, granny flats, and accessory units—all of which consume
less land per square foot of finished floor area (Nelson et al 2004). As more housing
units are accommodated per acre of land, the inflationary effects of growth
management regulation may be offset by density increases. This density offset may be
further augmented by economies of scale associated with higher-density development,
which can lower the per unit cost of infrastructure (Nelson and Knapp 1992).
From a classical economic perspective, then, the effects of an urban growth
boundary on per unit housing prices will depend, in part, on the relative strength of
7

two countervailing influences: increased land prices and increased density of
development (Phillips and Goodstein 2000, 336). Because of the potential to offset
land price increases through density gains, planners and policymakers have, in some
cases, incorporated density bonuses or minimum density zoning into growth
management policy. Arthur Nelson and Casey Dawkins have even suggested that an
urban growth boundary is prudent policy only when accompanied by policies that
increase development density and intensity (2004, 4).

Growth Management in International Settings
In a 2002 international comparison of urban containment policies, Dawkins and
Nelson offer a number of useful findings regarding the interaction of land and housing
markets in “managed growth” settings. First, Dawkins and Nelson demonstrate that
concerns regarding the effects of regulatory growth management are not limited to the
United States. The charge of regulation-induced housing price inflation has been
raised and thoroughly debated in the cases of South Korea and the United Kingdom,
both of which administer urban containment policies at the national level. Second, the
authors find that “it is clear that urban containment programs do affect land prices no
matter how they are implemented” (10). This finding is consistent with the consensus
view of Portland’s urban growth boundary and its effects on area land prices, as
summarized above.5
However, according to Dawkins and Nelson, the degree to which increased land
prices impact area housing markets depends on the design and implementation of a
region’s larger policy framework for growth management. This finding leads the
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authors to conclude that “the most important policy implication to be gleaned from
this review is that local planners play a significant role in determining the severity of
housing price inflation attributable to urban containment policies” (11).
In highlighting the role that local decision makers may play in mediating land
and housing markets, Nelson and Dawkins stress the importance of “proactive
measures” which may stem housing price inflation. Of particular importance are
policies that allow planners and/or policymakers to adjust buildable land supplies in
response to increased housing demand (Nelson and Dawkins 2004). By adding to the
supply of land available for development, decision makers may effectively guide
development without limiting housing supply. Furthermore, Nelson and Dawkins
(2002) suggest that auxiliary policies designed to increase development densities
and/or the production of affordable housing may be necessary to prevent housing price
inflation in areas regulated by growth management policies. For reasons discussed
above, policies promoting higher density development may offset land price increases.
For their part, pro-active affordable housing policies may reduce average home prices
by stimulating production of units targeted to low- and moderate-income households.

Problem Framework
Based on the literature summarized above, this case study rests on the following
assumptions:
•

Growth management policies which limit the supply of land available for
development tend to exert an upward pressure on prices for land within the
containment boundary.
9

•

By increasing the cost of land, regulatory growth management policies may
significantly increase average housing costs.

•

The degree to which land prices influence average home prices depends on the
structure and implementation of the larger growth management policy
framework.

•

Three specific types of policy appear to be particularly significant in mitigating
the impact of land price increases on housing affordability:
o Boundary flexibility: planners and policymakers may be able to stem land
and/or housing price inflation by adjusting the supply of land available for
development in response to market signals or demographic projections.
o Density increases: planners and policymakers may be able to stem housing
price inflation by allowing or encouraging significant density increases
within the area available for development.
o Affordable housing policy: planners and policymakers may be able to
maintain housing affordability for vulnerable populations by actively
promoting increased production of affordable housing.

Statement of Purpose
In the United States and the UK, a substantial body of literature has been
dedicated to analysis and debate regarding the effects of growth management on
housing costs. However, despite the Netherlands’ long history of managing urban
development via national regulations on buildable land supply, relatively little has
been written in English about the effects of those regulations on housing affordability.
10

Thus, the purpose of this case study is to explore these issues in the Dutch context,
with particular reference to the assumptions stated in the problem framework above.
The Dutch planning tradition of addressing housing affordability in conjunction with
spatial planning makes the Netherlands a particularly ripe setting for this exploratory
research.

Unit of Analysis
At the outset of this research, I was primarily focused on markets and
municipal policies in Amsterdam. My initial review of the literature had led me to
believe that, of the many tiers of Dutch government, municipalities played the most
active role in spatial planning and development policy. Furthermore, as the largest and
most cosmopolitan Dutch city, Amsterdam provided the largest quantity of resources
(both human and printed) accessible to English speakers. Finally, as my home city,
Amsterdam was familiar territory, which facilitated access to interview subjects and
added some ground-level perspective to the case study. For these reasons, I conducted
many of my early interviews with planning and housing experts in Amsterdam.
However, as my research progressed, I found that the market and policy
dynamics that most interested me were difficult to confine to the municipal level.
Rather than conforming to the municipal boundaries of Amsterdam, pertinent land and
housing markets tend to operate on a metropolitan scale, and in some cases extend to
the level of the polycentric mega-region (i.e. the Randstad). Furthermore, the suite of
policies that comprise Dutch growth management have most often been designed and
11

directed from the national level. For these reasons, I substantially expanded the focus
of my research to the national level, and began interviewing experts on mega-regional
and national affairs in addition to those focused on Amsterdam. Ultimately, then, this
case study is focused on Dutch markets and policies at the national level.

Central Research Question
How do planners and policymakers in the Netherlands conceptualize and manage the
relationship between land and housing markets, and the effects of that relationship on
housing affordability?

Methodology
Following the approaches described in Robert K. Yin’s Case Study Research
(2004), I will address the central research question in a case study combining elements
of description and exploration. The literature reviewed above provides some
substantial clues as to the areas of planning and policy of likely significance. From this
starting point, I began my research as a descriptive case study, intending to describe
the relationship between and management of land and housing markets in Amsterdam
in terms recognizable to planners and policymakers in the United States. However,
significant social/political/economic differences between the US and the Netherlands
required an exploratory approach open to new and unexpected findings.
Broad research questions rest on numerous unstated assumptions and often
lend insufficient purchase on the research subject. Explicit study propositions can shed
light on embedded assumptions and narrow the scope of research. According to Yin
12

(2004), study propositions function to “direct attention to something that should be
examined within the scope of study.” Two key propositions (A and B) are stated in the
research question framework below.
Yin also suggests the development of substantive case study questions, which
reflect the actual line of inquiry and serve as reminders to the researcher “regarding
the information that needs to be collected and why.” Case study questions are listed
below in two levels of detail: more general case study questions are numbered, while
the most specific case study questions are lettered in the lower-case.6

Research Question Framework
Proposition A:
The understanding of relationships between land and housing markets is likely to be
contested territory subject to debate and evolution over time.

1. How do Dutch planners, policymakers, and academic experts conceptualize the
relationship between current growth management policy and issues of housing
affordability?
A. Growth Management Policy
a. What are the principal objectives of Dutch growth management?
b. At what scale(s) of government is Dutch growth management planned?
c. At what scale(s) of government is Dutch growth management
implemented?
d. What are the principal policy tools used to implement growth
management?
e. What are the demonstrable outcomes (intended and unintended) of
Dutch growth management policies and practices?
B. Land Cost
a. Is it agreed that regulatory growth management policies increase the
cost of urbanizable land, or is this a point of debate?
13

b. If the above point is debated, what are the relevant perspectives and
points of contention?
C. Housing Cost
a. Is it agreed that regulatory growth management policies increase the
cost of housing, or is this a point of debate?
b. If the above point is debated, what are the relevant perspectives and
points of contention?
Proposition B:
The relationship between land and housing markets is mediated by the structure and
implementation of the spatial planning system.

2. How do planners and policymakers in the Netherlands attempt to influence housing
cost through the planning and social housing systems?
D. Development Density
a. What degree of control do planners exert over the density of new
residential development?
b. What planning/policy tools are used to influence residential
development density?
c. Do planners/policymakers encourage or compel residential density
increases in order to offset land scarcity?
d. Is there evidence of a market-based “density offset,” in which housing
producers respond to land price inflation by increasing development
density?
E. Land Supply Adjustment
a. What specific policies determine the supply of urbanizable land at the
national level?
b. Is the supply of urbanizable land adjusted in response to market signals,
demonstrated public needs, or expressed preferences?
c. If so, what are the demonstrable effects of land supply adjustments on
the cost of land and housing?
F. Affordable Housing Policy
a. What object oriented (or supply-side) policies have the greatest effects
on the supply of affordable housing units?
b. What subject oriented (or demand-side) policies have the greatest
effects on the ability of citizens to obtain affordable housing?
c. What other policies exist to encourage access to affordable housing
(e.g. rent regulations; tenant rights)?
14

3. To what degree do land costs impact residents’ housing costs in the Netherlands?
G. Policy Outcomes
a. Can an effect of regulatory growth management policies on urbanizable
land prices be empirically demonstrated?
b. Can an effect of regulatory growth management policies on housing
prices be empirically demonstrated?
c. How are demonstrable cost effects of regulatory growth management
(if any) distributed amongst landowners, municipalities, developers,
and housing consumers?
d. In terms of housing affordability/accessibility, how does the
Netherlands compare to other European nations?

Method of Investigation
The primary source of data for this case study is a series of semi-standardized
interviews conducted with experts in the field: academics, planners, civil servants, and
representatives of social housing corporations. Thanks to assistance from my advisors
at the University of Amsterdam, I was able to identify local experts who were willing
and able to be interviewed in English. In addition to taking the suggestions of my
advisors in selecting respondents, I practiced some “snowball sampling,” asking each
respondent for further leads. In total, I interviewed 19 subjects, representing a wide
range of institutions involved in spatial planning. Each interview lasted between one
and two hours. Having secured permission from subjects to publish their information
for the purposes of this research, I have included a full list of subjects’ names and
occupations in
Appendix D.
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SECTION II: GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
Scope and Intergovernmental Structure of Dutch Spatial Planning
In 1971, a special commission of the Dutch national government broadly defined
the scope of spatial planning in the Netherlands. According to the commission, spatial
planning operates “in society’s best interest, to search for, and work towards, the best
possible mutual adjustment between the physical environment and society” (quoted in
Faludi 1994, 502). This definition built on historic traditions of public land
management in the Netherlands, wherein the state acted to balance demands on the
limited supply of dry, buildable land. However, the commission’s definition
significantly expanded the domain of spatial planning, “from mere land-use regulation
to the comprehensive management of the environment,” and implied the integration of
traditional policy sectors concerning development and the natural environment (Faludi
1994, 502). Although it was written in 1971, this definition nicely captures the
expansive role played by Dutch spatial planning throughout much of the late 20th
century.
At the national level, these broad planning powers are exercised by the Ministry
of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environmental Policy, or Ministerie van
Volkshuisveting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer (VROM). Commonly known
by its Dutch acronym, VROM is responsible for producing and periodically updating
the National Spatial Strategy, or Nota, which functions as a national spatial plan
(Needham 2007, 135). In the Nota, VROM lays out broad objectives for spatial and
environmental policy at the national scale, often with a time horizon of twenty to thirty
16

years. The Nota also addresses intergovernmental coordination, and “says more than
what the national government intends to do: it says also what the government wants
municipalities and provinces to do in order to realize the national spatial planning
policies” (Needham 2007, 136).
For many foreign researchers interested in Dutch spatial planning, VROM’s
National Spatial Strategy is an obvious point of entry. The Ministry goes to significant
lengths to make its policy documents accessible, rolling out Notas as full-color
booklets replete with maps and graphics, written in clear language and published in
Dutch, English, French, and German. As economist and planning scholar Barrie
Needham (2007) has noted, this public relations effort has a significant effect on the
image of VROM, especially in the eyes of foreign observers. Many scholars visiting
from abroad leave the Netherlands under the impression that, as author of the National
Spatial Strategy, VROM is the most influential player in a hierarchical system of
centralized spatial planning (Needham 2007, 121).
The reality of Dutch spatial planning is far more complex. The structure of
governance in the Netherlands is best described as a decentralized unitary state, in
which “public powers are distributed between the three layers of government, each of
which has a certain amount of autonomy (the powers are decentralized); […]
nevertheless none of those three levels may take actions which contradict the actions
of the other levels (the state is unitary)” (Needham 2007, 142). In this system, formal
hierarchical powers are invoked only as a last resort. Instead, the work of governance
is accomplished through negotiation, compromise, and consensus-building (van der
17

Valk 2002, 205). Barrie Needham (2007) explains the significance of this system of
governance for the work of spatial planning:
In a strict hierarchical system, the national government determines spatial
planning policy in general, the province works that out for its own area, the
municipality works it out further in detail. Those are not the rules in the
Netherlands. All three levels make spatial policy for their areas at the same time,
existing plans remain valid even though they no longer conform to the policy of
higher levels, there is a continual shifting of policies and a continual mutual
influencing between the three levels. (143, emphasis added)
Because of this interdependence and mutual influence between layers of government,
a full exploration of Dutch growth management would necessarily address formal
policies and informal relationships at and between the many levels of government:
national, provincial, regional, municipal, and sub-municipal (stadsdelen). For obvious
reasons, such a thorough exploration of Dutch governance is well beyond the scope of
this case study. Instead of aiming for a comprehensive treatment of the subject, I will
focus here on the aspects of Dutch growth management emphasized most often in the
literature, and by the planning experts I interviewed.
FIGURE 1: Layers of Government and their Areas of Planning Responsibility

Source: van der Valk (2002), pp. 206.
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The Role of National Planning
“There is a firm conviction that national government is responsible for the
evolving pattern of urbanization but that, preferably, it should not resort to
compulsion to get its views accepted. Plans are indicative, and national planning
is primarily the generator of ideas. Reserve powers of issuing national directives
are used with great circumspection.”
(Faludi 1992, 101)

This passage neatly captures a sentiment I heard expressed time and again in
interviews: VROM does not generally rely on formal hierarchical power to implement
the National Spatial Strategy. To be sure, Dutch law does grant the national
government certain hierarchical powers over lower tiers of government, including
powers to review, veto, and re-write certain land use plans originating at the municipal
and provincial levels.7 However, the act of invoking statutory power is seen as a sign
of poor negotiation skills and as an admission of administrative failure, and is
therefore considered the option of last resort (Needham 2007, 145; van der Valk 2002,
205).
When asked about the role of national planning, the experts I interviewed
seemed to agree that VROM’s most important contribution is in “setting the tone” for
spatial planning in the Netherlands. By periodically updating and widely distributing
the National Spatial Strategy, VROM gives currency to a common set of concepts and
objectives to be discussed and pursued throughout the vast Dutch planning
19

community. This view of VROM’s influence is substantiated by two of the preeminent scholars of Dutch spatial planning, Andreas Faludi and Arnold van der Valk.
In their 1994 book entitled Rule and Order, Faludi and van der Valk argue
convincingly that the planning successes of the 1970s and 1980s relied not on a
specific set of policy tools or formal state powers, but on a consensus-based planning
doctrine that shaped the assumptive world of planners. This planning doctrine did not
develop spontaneously, but reflected VROM’s efforts to clearly define the problems
confronting Dutch society and to indicate specific planning solutions to those
problems (Faludi 1992, 99-100).
Important as this form of “soft power” may be, the influence of VROM is not
limited to shaping the assumptive world of Dutch planners. When discussing the role
of the national government, interview subjects also emphasized the importance of the
“golden strings” of national subsidies. Provincial and municipal governments in the
Netherlands collect only a small fraction of their total revenues from local sources. For
municipalities, 19% of total revenue is collected locally; for provinces, the figure is
24% (2005 figures). The rest comes in the form of transfers from the central
government—transfers which often carry very specific provisions for the use of funds
(Needham 2007, 143). According to some interview subjects, these provisions
represent the most influential form of national planning in the Netherlands. “He who
pays the piper calls the tune,” as Faludi and van der Valk note. “Even where there are
no formal powers of direction, if it puts its mind to it, central government can persuade
municipalities to follow its policies. Formally, municipalities are autonomous. In fact
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they are dependent on central government.” (Faludi and van der Valk 1991, 46).

The Role of Municipal Planning
When asked to identify the level of government with the most direct influence
over development in the Netherlands, experts invariably point to the municipality.
This unparalleled influence is exerted through two distinct processes: the issuing of
building permits, and the supplying of land prepared for development.

Building Permits and “Postage Stamp Planning”
In the Netherlands, the municipal government retains exclusive power to issue
or deny building permits, which are required by law before any development can
commence. This exclusive power gives municipalities a trump card in negotiations
with private developers, and with planners at other levels of government. In addition
to municipal building codes, permit applications are subject to an “aesthetic test”
conducted by an independent panel of experts (e.g. architects and designers.) More
importantly, the building permit is used to implement and enforce the municipal land
use plan, which can specify detailed land uses and design requirements including
building placement and the mass, height, and density of development (Needham 2007,
130).
Dutch planning law requires municipalities to produce a land use plan for all
open space existing within municipal boundaries. This bestemingsplan is primarily
regulatory in its function: it is most effective as a tool for maintaining the status quo
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(Needham 2007, 132). When considering building permits for proposed new
development, municipal planners compare the proposed use to the bestemingsplan. If
the proposed use is not allowed under the existing bestemingsplan, the building permit
is denied. In this way, planners utilize control over the building permit to regulate
development in accordance with the municipal plan. This is the most direct form of
regulatory growth management available to planners in the Netherlands.
However, when municipal planners would like to see a change in land use occur,
as in the case of desired greenfield development, the law allows them significant
flexibility. Under Dutch law, the bestemingsplan can be amended for areas of any size.
Municipal planners frequently utilize this flexibility to plan at the scale of individual
developments, drawing up site-specific plans authorizing the land uses proposed by a
developer. As a result of this practice of “postage stamp planning,” small land-use
plans proliferate in the Netherlands. For example, the municipality of Nijmegen, with
160,000 residents, had 840 valid land use plans on the books as of November 2006
(Needham 2007 130).
Of course, drawing up new land use plans takes time: “If the procedures are
followed as quickly as is allowed, and if there are no objections and appeals, it can
take between 43 and 62 weeks to make a new plan” (Needham 2007, 160). In
situations where planners and developers prefer to move faster—and there are many of
these—planners have the power to approve a non-conforming building permit by
stating that the proposed use conforms to a new bestemingsplan which is still in the
works. In practice, many of these ostensibly forthcoming land use plans are never
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completed, and the non-conforming use is allowed to stand (Needham 2007, 160-162).
According to Barrie Needham, “nobody bothered much about the misuse of the
planning law [in this manner], until the national government decided that it was so
widespread that it made a mockery of the claim that the planning system gave the
citizen legal certainty” (161).
Recently, the national planning law has been amended to reduce the flexibility of
planning at the municipal level, and to increase the predictability and certainty of the
planning system for developers and citizens. Nevertheless, municipal planners retain a
great deal of discretionary power when it comes to enforcing the bestemingsplan.
When it is needed, the bestemingsplan can be rigidly enforced via the building permit
to preserve open space. And when development is desired, municipal planners have
plenty of available avenues through which non-conforming proposals can be approved
and realized (Needham 2007, 160-162).

Supplying Buildable Land
Because of the high water table and prevalence of unstable peat bogs in the
Netherlands, real estate development is only possible after a complex and expensive
process of land preparation. This is especially true in the west of the country, where
elevations are lowest, and where most of the Dutch population resides. Generally
speaking, land must be drained, pumped dry, and filled in with sand and other
stabilizing material before infrastructure can be added and building can commence.
More intensive forms of development can require far more complex and costly land
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preparation, e.g. the sinking of stabilizing rods deep into the marshy soil.8
Traditionally, developers of housing and commercial buildings have been extremely
limited in their capacity to prepare land in this manner. Since the late 18th century,
municipal governments have taken responsibility for this task, supplying prepared land
as a public good to allow for development (Faludi and van der Valk 1991, 46).
Throughout much of the twentieth century, private real estate interests were
dependent upon municipal governments for a supply of buildable land, giving public
officials considerable control over the pace and location of development. Andreas
Faludi (1994) elaborates on the implications of this dependence for municipal
planning:
The municipality can stipulate what has to be built, when, by whom, for whom,
at what price, and so forth. It can put its land policy at the service of planning.
This is indeed what happens. Municipalities provide as much as 80 per cent of
land coming into development. […] Here is a unique feature of Dutch planning,
if ever there was one. (496)
Although the municipal government’s monopoly on land preparation has recently been
challenged by private developers, many municipalities remain the primary suppliers of
prepared land. Under Dutch law, state agencies enjoy the same rights of property
ownership as individuals. Because of this, municipalities are able to attach detailed
conditions to the sale of public lands, including “when the building must start and
when it must be completed; the price of housing to be built; [and] whether [the
housing] is for sale or for rent.” (Needham 2007, 184).
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By preparing and selling land with conditions attached, municipal authorities are
able to control the buildable land base through “just in time” delivery, adjusting land
supply relative to demand in order to encourage desired land uses (Korthals Altes
2008, 8-9). Furthermore, as dominant players in the land market, municipalities can
often influence land prices, and can elect to subsidize desired forms of development
by providing prepared land at reduced cost. 9 This price-setting power also allows
municipalities to cross-subsidize development by channeling the surplus captured
from more profitable forms of building into social goods such as affordable housing,
green space, or infrastructure (Needham 2007, 186; Faludi and van der Valk 1991,
46). Through this system of cross-subsidies, municipal planners control large
surpluses, which can be used to stimulate desired forms of development.

Growth Management and the Combination of Positive and Negative Planning
In the typology cited in the introduction above, Bengston et al (2004) divide the
universe of growth management policy into three basic categories: public acquisition,
regulation, and incentives. In the Netherlands, spatial planners draw a similar
distinction between “planning by permission” (toelatingsplanologie) and “planning for
development” (ontwikkelingsplanologie)— essentially collapsing three categories into
two by combining public acquisition and incentives under the heading of “planning for
development.”
Planners from abroad may look at the Netherlands and see a highly regulated
system of land management featuring rigid restrictions on greenfield development.
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Dutch planners, however, tend to see themselves as facilitators of appropriate
development. According to Barrie Needham (2007), the term for negative/regulatory
planning (toelatingsplanologie) “is used [by Dutch planners] in a rather derogatory
sense. For, it is argued, land use planning should not be about stopping people
changing the use of land…Land use planning should encourage development (called
approvingly ‘ontwikkelingsplanologie’)” (172).
The tendency to favor planning for development is rooted in the Dutch tradition
of reclaiming land and building infrastructure for water management, which confers
near-heroic status to builders, developers, and civil engineers (Needham 2007). In the
Netherlands, “the builders push society forward. Land use planners are expected to
help them in their pioneering work. If planning proposes that, nevertheless, some areas
be protected from further development, planning is expected to put forward alternative
building locations: development can be controlled and steered in the interests of good
planning, but it should not be discouraged” (Needham 2007, 27).
While Dutch planners may favor development-oriented positive planning over
regulatory negative planning, scholars agree that growth management in the
Netherlands is characterized by the balanced coordination of these approaches
(Korthals Altes 2006, 103; see also Siraa et al 1995, 29; Cals et al 1966, 195). In his
studies of Dutch spatial planning, Andreas Faludi argues that “successful growth
management has two faces: first, the prevention of growth where it should not occur;
second, the provision for commensurate growth (with facilities included) in other
designated areas” (Faludi 1994, 486; see also Faludi 1992, 93). Reflecting this balance
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between regulation and stimulation, growth management has been pursued on a
national scale as the agricultural “Green Heart” of the country has been kept open
while development has been encouraged within a conurbation known as the Randstad.

Preserving the Green Heart
The preservation of open space for agricultural and recreational uses has been
a top priority of national spatial planning since shortly after World War II. During
post-war reconstruction, proponents of growth management emphasized the threat that
disorganized development posed to the nation’s food supply and economic wellbeing.
To prevent a “sea of houses” from consuming the nation’s farmland, supporters
lobbied for the strict preservation of agricultural and recreational functions in the
“Green Heart” (Het Groene Hart), a large open area located in the center-west of the
Netherlands (Zonneveld 2007, 663). After coasting for a time on rhetorical power
alone, the Green Heart concept was formalized and adopted into national spatial
planning policy in the 1960s (Koomen et al 2008, 365).
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FIGURE 2: The Green Heart

The Green Heart, surrounded by the “defensive line” of national spatial planning. As
presented by Faludi and van der Valk (1994).
In the effort to preserve agricultural and recreational functions in the Green
Heart, the power of municipalities to implement national planning directives has been
essential (Zonneveld 2007, 659). This implementation process consists of two steps:
first, the municipality adopts a local land use plan conforming to the national plan for
open space preservation. Subsequently, the municipality can enforce its local plan via
control of the building permit (Faludi 1994, 493; 498).10 By refusing to grant permits
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in planned open areas, the municipality can effectively prevent all development in
locations that the national government has designated for agricultural and recreational
uses. In this way, municipal control of the building permit has been used with great
effect to implement national preservation policies (Needham 2007, 171).
A secondary approach employed in the broader effort to separate town and
country is the green “buffer zone.” Functioning as wedges between growing cities,
buffer zones are designated open areas strategically employed by the national
government to prevent conurbation (Needham 2007, 91). As in the case of the Green
Heart, buffer zones are implemented via adoption into local land use plans and
enforced through the building permit system. In total, ten buffer zones have been
designated, ranging in size from 3 to 8,700 hectares (Koomen et al 2008, 361-377). By
combining buffer zones with the Green Heart preservation strategy, national spatial
planners have managed to preserve 87% of surface area in the Netherlands as open
space. Of that open space, about 75% (or 69% of national land area) is dedicated to
agricultural functions (Koomen et al 2008, 364).

Structuring Urbanized Areas
In addition to preserving valued agricultural land and recreational
opportunities, open space preservation policies perform the function of structuring
urbanized areas. The urban counterpart to the Green Heart concept is the Randstad, or
“rim city,” a term that describes the urbanized band connecting the four largest Dutch
cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht. This band of cities and towns,
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which is home to over half of the Dutch population, stretches along the Western coast
of the Netherlands and defines the outer edge of the Green Heart.11
During the initial period of postwar national planning, the Randstad
agglomeration was strengthened through limitations on development in the Green
Heart. Then, in 1974, VROM announced a policy of “bundled deconcentration”
designed to accommodate population growth in strategic locations within the
Randstad, thus adding further strength to the established rural/urban contrast in the
West of the country (Faludi 1994, 493). In total, VROM designated fifteen new and
growing townsdecision makerlocated within the Randstad belt but outside major
citiesdecision makerto act as growth centers by accommodating new development. In
the early 1980s, at the peak of the “bundled deconcentration” era, close to one quarter
of all new housing development in the Netherlands took place within growth centers
(Faludi 1994, 493). This strategy allowed for a controlled dispersal of population, and
was seen as the only alternative to widespread suburbanization (Faludi and van der
Valk 1991, 47).
In keeping with the overarching strategy of combining restrictive and
stimulative planning measures, VROM executed the “bundled deconcentration”
strategy by coordinating development regulations and subsidies. In total, VROM
channeled an estimated 4.5 billion guilders to stimulate the development of growth
centers (Faludi and van der Valk 1991, 48). These subsidies were used to finance
infrastructure, housing, and the additional administrative costs borne by the effected
municipalities (Faldui and van der Valk 1991, 47). In this way, the central government
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balanced strict restrictions on development in the Green Heart, offered a massive
down payment on the growth centers policy, and set the scene for significant private
investment.

The ‘Marriage of Convenience’ and the Housing Imperative
The policy of “bundled deconcentration” provides one example of the strategic
alliance formed between national spatial planning and housing efforts (Faludi 1994).
In this “marriage of convenience,” which lasted from the 1960s through the 1980s,
urbanization policies directly supported open space preservation by absorbing
development pressure, while access to the Green Heart made dense urban living
palatable for residents of the new “growth centers.” However, while this partnership
has often been described as a “marriage” (Faludi 1994), the balance of power between
partners was far from equal. Because of a chronic housing shortage in the postwar
period, the provision of new housing en masse was seen as the highest priority of
spatial planning (Rouwendal et al 2004, 7). When necessary, agricultural preservation
goals and other spatial objectives were sacrificed to the dominant concern for housing
supply.
During the heavy battles and bombing raids of World War II, the Dutch building
stock suffered extensive damage. Of the 2.1 million homes that existed in 1940,
82,000 were destroyed and 45,000 heavily damaged by the war’s end, leaving scores
of families without adequate shelter (Siraa 1989, 43; quoted in Faludi 1994, 490).
Immediately following the war, this critical housing shortage was compounded by
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demographic shifts, as a national baby boom coincided with rapid industrialization and
an attendant wave of urban in-migration (Faludi and van der Valk 1991, 45). The net
result was a national housing supply that fell woefully short of demand. During the
1950s, overcoming this deficit and providing housing for a fast-growing urban
population became the highest priority for Dutch spatial planners.
The national government’s response to the postwar housing crisis has been
described as “the most ambitious social housing program ever attempted that set as a
national commitment that all Dutch citizens should be adequately housed.”
(O’Loughlin, as quoted in Faludi 1994, 504). To fulfill this commitment, the Dutch
government partnered closely with non-profit housing associations. Formed in the late
19th-century as a secondary support to the private market, non-profit housing
associations had played a relatively minor role in Dutch society during the first half of
the twentieth century (Priemus 2003, 329). However, after the second world war,
while private investment in housing production lagged, the national government found
it could orchestrate “a high volume of new construction through the not-for-profit
sector with relative ease” (Milligan et al 2006, 240).
Working in cooperation with municipal planning departments, the national
government marshaled public control over land supply to confer large subsidies to
non-profit housing associations (Needham 2007, 67). By draining, filling, and
stabilizing marshland and adding basic infrastructure for development, “the State paid
about two-thirds of the average land costs per dwelling and demonstrated its readiness
to run great financial risks.” (Priemus 1998, 31). In this way, subsidies from the
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national government kick-started a massive program of social housing development
with the objective of providing adequate shelter to all citizens. As they churned out
expansive housing developments that conformed neatly to the wishes of national and
municipal planners, non-profit housing associations assumed a central role in the
burgeoning Dutch welfare state (Priemus 2003, 329)
Largely as a result of the national building program of the postwar decades,
nearly one third (31%) of the modern Dutch housing stock is in multi-family
apartment-style developments (Pellenbarg and van Steen 2005, 133). In the Randstad
cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague, multi-family developments are
particularly common, comprising up to 75% of the local housing stock (Pellenbarg and
van Steen 2005, 594). Two- to four-story row houses typical of the pre-WWI era
comprise 42% of the national housing stock, while semi-detached and detached units
are in the minority, comprising 14% and 13% of the housing stock, respectively
(Pellenbarg and van Steen 2005, 133).
By US standards, average housing densities are moderately high in the
Netherlands, at approximately 12 housing units per acre. Furthermore, the range of
housing densities across district types is fairly narrow, with central urban areas
averaging 20 units per acre and small villages averaging 8 units per acre (Brouwer
2000, 316). It is worth noting that, at 7.6 units per acre, average housing density in the
United States is roughly equivalent to that of small Dutch villages (Ewing et al 2008,
19). Statistics illustrating additional characteristics of the Dutch built environment are
provided in Figure 3, below.
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FIGURE 3: Relative Incidences, Areas and Population Densities of
District Types

Source: Brouwer (2000), pp. 320.

Section II Summary
This section has provided an overview of Dutch growth management efforts
beginning with post-WWII reconstruction and continuing through to the “bundled
deconcentration” era, which lasted until the late 1980s. During this period, growth
management was pursued on a national scale in the Netherlands, as open space was
preserved in the Green Heart and designated buffer zones while development was
encouraged within the Randstad conurbation.
The strategy of Green Heart preservation was championed by VROM and
implemented through a combination of national and municipal policies. After
introducing key concepts such as the Green Heart and the Randstad into the national
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planning doctrine, VROM channeled resources and coordinated with municipal
governments to enact a strategy of “bundled deconcentration.” Massive investments of
national funds into the development of growth centers and into the non-profit housing
sector were essential to the strategy of “bundled deconcentration,” and provide an
example of VROM’s “golden strings” of influence. However, vertical coordination
between layers of government was also essential to the growth management efforts of
this era, as municipal governments adopted the Green Heart into local spatial plans
and enforced development restrictions through control of the building permit.
Research by Geurs and van Wee (2007), based on the construction and analysis of
alternative development scenarios, suggests that national growth management policies
had significant effects on urban form during the period 1970-2000, reducing
automobility and limiting the conversion of open space to urban uses.

Reflections on the Problem Framework
In the problem framework guiding this research, I state that growth management
policies which limit the supply of land available for development tend to exert an
upward pressure on prices for land within the containment boundary. Furthermore, I
suggest that, by increasing the cost of land, regulatory growth management policies
may significantly increase the average housing cost. However, during the period
outlined above, it would appear that Dutch growth management policies did not
significantly impact average housing costs in the Netherlands. Two features of Dutch
spatial planning help to explain this phenomenon: flexible land supply, and subsidies
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to non-profit housing developers.
Research into historic land values has demonstrated that during the “bundled
deconcentration” era, “the supply of developable land was so large that there was no
value increment between agricultural land value and land designated for urban land
development” (Korthals Altes 2008, 8). The inflation of urbanizable land value was
prevented through a careful balance of development restrictions and subsidies, which
accommodated development pressure in strategic locations. As Barrie Needham has
argued, maintaining that balance was a central objective of spatial planning during the
1960s, 70s, and 80s: “One of the main functions of land use planning in those decades
was to make land available for housing development. The locations were determined
in consultation between national and local government, the land was acquired and
serviced by local government. […] It is no wonder that, in that period, there was great
conformity between the planning policy for housing locations and the results on the
ground” (Needham 2007, 67).
In point of fact, Dutch spatial planners did not place absolute limits on the
supply of land available for development during this period. Instead, the area of
developable land was strategically increased over time in response to local demands
for housing and development, while consistent pressure from the national government
ensured that the Green Heart and buffer zones remained largely dedicated to open
space. In keeping with the decentralized unitary state model of governance, this
approach was characterized by constant negotiation and compromise between
municipal and national governments. Much like a flexible urban growth boundary, this
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approach allowed development to be steered to strategic locations (e.g. growth
centers) without placing absolute restrictions on land supply.
When discussing average housing costs during the “bundled deconcentration”
era, it would be difficult to over-state the impact of non-profit housing development.
Supported by subsidies in the form of direct infusions from the national government
and prepared land from municipalities, the Dutch social housing stock grew by more
than 620% between 1947 and 1981 (Milligan et al 2006, 240). At the peak of social
housing production in early 1980s, 90% of housing starts in the Netherlands were
subsidized in this fashion (Faludi 1994, 497). By the early 1990s, at the end of the
“bundled deconcentration” era, Dutch housing associations owned and operated 44%
of the national stock (Boelhouwer 2002).
As I have stated in the problem framework above, policies promoting the
development of affordable housing have the potential to offset land price increases
that may result from growth management regulations. In the case of the Netherlands,
affordable housing development was not an auxiliary policy designed to mitigate
unintended outcomes, but a cornerstone of the “bundled deconcentration” strategy.
During this period of Dutch growth management, Europe’s most aggressive program
of open space preservation was matched by Europe’s most ambitious social housing
program.
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SECTION III: GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE 1980s AND 1990s
The Recession of the 1980’s
After decades of sustained economic growth fueled by a post-war industrial
boom, a deep recession hit the Netherlands in 1980. Climbing steadily from five
percent in 1979, the national unemployment rate reached double digits in 1982 and
hovered in the range of ten percent until the end of the decade. With nearly two-thirds
of the population collecting public benefits while national economic growth stagnated,
it suddenly appeared that the Dutch welfare state was vulnerable to collapse, and a
new set of buzz words came to dominate domestic politics: deregulation,
decentralization and privatization (Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 176).
A new right-of-center governing coalition stepped into power in 1982,
emphasizing free markets and economic competitiveness while slashing public
spending. In this climate of fiscal austerity, the “marriage” of spatial planning and
social housing came under intense scrutiny. This is reflected in the fourth edition of
VROM’s National Spatial Strategy, which was drafted at the height of the recession in
the mid-1980s. The report downplayed traditional growth management themes, instead
emphasizing the need to safeguard the nation’s economic position. According to
Faludi (1994), “the secret agenda [of the Fourth Report] was to reprogram planning
from a policy essentially concerned with housing” and open space, “to one concerned
with economic restructuring, including the necessary infrastructure provisions” (495).
At the same time, the national government initiated a rapid draw-down of subsidies for
social housing in an effort to cut the golden strings supporting non-profit housing
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associations. In an era of staggering national debt and stagnant economic growth,
housing subsidies had lost their base of support in the Dutch parliament (Priemus
1998, 32).
However, by 1993, economic and political winds had shifted in the Netherlands.
Just three years after the Fourth Report was finalized, VROM published the “Fourth
Report - Extra” with backing from a new left-of-center governing coalition. In spite of
its title, which suggests a reinforcement of the original Fourth Report, the ‘Extra’
version broke from its predecessor and returned to traditional spatial priorities of
Dutch planning, “refocusing on the Randstad and Green Heart complex of ideas…and
instituting yet more stringent restrictive policies in the Green Heart” (Faludi 1994,
495).
With the publication of the Fourth Report - Extra, growth management returned
to its central position on the national planning agenda. However, the preceding decade
of recession and fiscal austerity had taken its toll on the alliance between spatial
planning and housing. This section will elaborate on the Fourth Report-Extra, the
privatization of social housing provision, and the effects of these developments on
land and housing markets in the Netherlands.

The VINEX Era
The publication of VROM’s Fourth Report - Extra was a watershed moment in
the history of Dutch growth management policy. The report, which is commonly
known by the acronym VINEX (Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening - Extra), marked
39

the end of the “bundled deconcentration” era, and the introduction of a new doctrine in
Dutch spatial planning: the compact city.
The VINEX report was based on a projection of substantial population growth
and attendant demand for new housing. VINEX authors estimated a need for 835,000
new homes in the Netherlands between the years of 1995 and 2015. The majority of
that growth (485,000 homes) was expected to occur in and around the built-up area of
the Randstad (Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 220). Rather than dispersing
development into nodes of “bundled deconcentration” removed from established city
centers, VINEX directed provinces and municipalities to develop according to a strict
set of location priorities designed to reinforce existing patterns of urbanization.
Reflecting the rise of environmentalism in Dutch planning circles during the 1980s,
compact city policies were designed, above all, to limit automobility and support
alternative modes of transit (Priemus 1998, 33).
With the conclusion of the “bundled deconcentration” era and the attendant
emphasis on housing provision, the preparation of ample land supplies to facilitate
new development came to an end (Vermeulen and Rouwendal 2007). The new
compact city approach emphasized infill development, giving top priority to sites
within urbanized areas. If these sites offered insufficient development capacity, sites
on the edges of existing urban areas would be developed at densities comparable to the
urban core. As a last resort, new urban nodes would be established in greenfield
locations, provided that they were situated as close to existing cities as possible
(Needham and Faludi 1999, 482). Under this compact city model, “urban regions
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would function as compact daily urban systems. Concentration policies were there to
maintain support for urban services, to limit mobility growth, to allocate housing,
employment, and facilities in order to optimize accessibility by bicycle and public
transport, and to contain the further urbanization of rural areas” (Korthals Altes 2006,
102).
Heightened environmental concerns were also reflected in stronger and more
rigid protections for open spaces under VINEX. To maintain the viability of
agricultural and recreational uses of open areas, VINEX featured a “hardened” border
surrounding the Green Heart and strict limitations on rural development. Throughout
the preceding era of “bundled deconcentration,” VROM’s spatial planners had relied
primarily on strong rhetoric and negotiating skills to protect the Green Heart from
urban encroachment (Zonneveld 2007, 663-665). However, “in the VINEX, for the
very first time, a line was drawn on the map to mark the boundary of the Green Heart
[…] In 1997, this line acquired legal status as a ‘concrete policy decision’ […]
meaning that the provinces were obliged to include this line in their plans” (Zonneveld
2007, 668). By extension, this development also required municipalities to respect the
Green Heart’s newly formalized boundary, and to defend it with the power of the
building permit.
Within the Green Heart and other protected areas, towns and villages were
allowed to plan for development only when new housing was required to
accommodate “indigenous need.” Under pressure from VROM, provincial authorities
enforced this policy by demanding proof of natural population increases before
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approving municipal land use plans for development (Faludi 1992, 95). Although this
form of growth control had been introduced in the era of “bundled deconcentration,”
VROM further tightened the restrictions on rural development under VINEX (Evers et
al 2000, 12).

Continued Privatization
In addition to intensified policies containing urban growth and limiting rural
development, the VINEX era featured a marked shift away from central government
subsidies for local development. Reflecting the impact of the recent recession, the
VINEX authors reinforced the theme of privatization introduced in the Fourth Report
by emphasizing the importance of public-private partnerships while signaling a
disengagement from large-scale stimulative planning (Faludi and van der Valk 1994,
222; Faludi 1992, 104). The central government’s role in supporting social housing
was thought to be particularly problematic. Writing one year after VINEX publication,
Faludi and van der Valk (1994) hinted at things to come: “The [national] government
is critically reviewing its housing role against the background of a wholesale
reappraisal of the welfare state. Subsidies are generally looked at with suspicion. The
consensus is that the Dutch need to be weaned of them” (228).
In fact, the “marriage” of spatial planning and social housing had been under
threat since the mid-1980s, when the central government initiated a precipitous drawdown of annual loans to non-profit housing developers. In 1988, the Ministry of
Housing published a policy memo entitled “Housing in the Nineties,” which promised
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a steep reduction in annual subsidies toward the operating costs of social housing
associations (Priemus 1998, 32). Negotiations between the central government and
representatives of the housing associations commenced, focusing on the task of
privatizing the housing associations and disentangling the Dutch government from its
de facto ministry of social housing production. In 1995, privatization was finalized
when the parties swapped debt obligations and agreed to go their separate ways. In this
arrangement, the central government collected in full the debt it was owed by the
social housing sector (approximately EUR 17 billion) while simultaneously paying out
promised subsidies in a lump sum of more than EUR 16 billion (Priemus 2003, 330).
In addition to the payout, housing associations received a great deal of operating
freedom in the arrangement (AEDES 2007). However, they also assumed the
responsibility to act as private entities, taking on attendant financial risks and
competing for market position with private developers.

From Steering Growth to Limiting Land Supply
At the time of VINEX publication in 1993, the privatization of social housing
was well under way, and the sector’s strategic alliance with spatial planning had
already broken down. In search of a new partner to help execute plans for
development, VROM looked to private developers of higher-valued ownership
housing. Thus, in the new development areas identified in VINEX, VROM imposed a
maximum limit of 30% social housing, leaving 70% of housing to be supplied by
private developers (Needham and Faludi 1999, 488). To appreciate this policy as a
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limit on social housing production, it should be recalled that in the early 1980’s, at the
peak of investment in the growth centers, 90% of housing starts nationwide had been
subsidized (Faludi 1994, 497). This limitation on social housing was designed to
increase the proportion of higher-valued homes, in part to accommodate more- middle
and upper-income households within city centers and the new VINEX developments
(Korthals Altes 2007, 1503-1504).
With reduced capacity to subsidize municipal development directly, VROM
introduced a new approach to land preparation designed to make up for the shortfall.
As I have discussed above, growth management policy during the “bundled
deconcentration” era had featured a steady supply of land available for development in
order to prevent the inflation of urbanizable land values. In the VINEX era, VROM
did an about-face, intentionally limiting the supply of land relative to demand so as to
drive up urbanizable land values and increase the surplus generated by municipal land
developers (Evers et al 2000, 11; Faludi and van der Valk 1994, 225). This spatial
strategy was augmented by the shift to increased ownership housing, which was
expected to result in higher market values for developable land (Needham 2007, 193).
Needham and Faludi explain the reasoning behind this aspect of VINEX policy: “the
more effective restriction on development outside the city region should increase the
price of building land within the city region, thus permitting the municipalities to
cover out of land sales more of the infrastructure costs, thus reducing the need for
governmental subsidies” (Needham and Faludi 1999, 487).
In other words, in the VINEX era, VROM marshaled rural growth limitations
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and a “hardened” boundary protecting the Green Heart to limit the supply of land
available for development. By driving up urbanizable land cost, this policy was
intended to make the business of land preparation more profitable for municipal
governments. The increased surplus gained from preparing land for development
could then be used to finance publicly supplied infrastructure, open space, and—to a
limited extent—social housing.

The Great Miscalculation
The policy of limiting land supply to increase municipal revenues rested on a
critical assumption: namely, that municipal governments would retain their dominant
position as the suppliers of prepared land. Needham and Faludi (1999) provide the
historical context behind this assumption:
There had been so much experience with this development process; it had
worked so well that it had become taken for granted. And even though [with
VINEX] the government introduced as part of its growth management strategy
some changes in the conditions under which housing development would take
place, insufficient attention was given to the possibility that those changes might
influence the markets for land and development (489).
Dutch spatial planners have since dubbed this assumption “the great miscalculation.”
While developing the compact city strategy, VROM planners had begun discussing
location priorities for new development as early as 1990, when the first draft of the
VINEX report was circulated. Because land speculation had been virtually nonexistent
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in recent history, planners discussed potential development locations openly and
waited until financing had been secured to initiate land purchases.12 However, “when
the municipalities involved were ready to start acquiring the unserviced land, as was
their wont, they discovered to their surprise that the farmers from whom they wanted
to buy had often sold the land just recently.” (Needham 1997, 294).
VROM’s great miscalculation was to intentionally increase the profitability of
land preparation, expecting the additional surplus to go to municipal governments
without considering potential competition from private developers. However, the
combination of land supply limitations and the shift to private housing development
had driven up the cost of urbanizable land to a point where potential profits from land
development outweighed the financial risks involved (Needham 2007, 193). “Whereas
[land preparation] had, for decades, been commercially unattractive, it had suddenly
become attractive. Developers had seen their chance, and had acquired land in
advance” (Needham 1997, 294).
In this way, VINEX ushered in a new era of speculative development and
significantly altered the balance of power between municipal governments and private
developers. For planners, this was an extremely unwelcome development: “It gives to
the municipality fewer possibilities for influencing the composition, phasing and
layout of housing development, it reduces the possibilities that municipalities have of
steering [development] through prices and financial flows, and it makes it much more
difficult for municipalities to use development gains on land for improving the quality
of residential areas” (Needham and Faludi 1999, 489).
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Section III Summary
The recession of the 1980s prompted a wholesale reexamination of the Dutch
welfare state and destabilized the strategic alliance underpinning traditional growth
management. By the early 1990s, it was clear that the marriage between spatial planning
and social housing had dissolved. The golden strings connecting social housing
associations to the national government had been cut, and the newly privatized
associations would be responsible for their own financial risks. For spatial planners, the
traditional mission of providing adequate land and infrastructure for development had
been abandoned in favor of a new priority: the concentration of development in and
around existing urban areas. Under VINEX policy, environmental concerns trumped all
other planning objectives, lending new urgency to the tasks of preserving open space and
reducing automobility (Priemus 1998).
Thus, new development under VINEX would be highly concentrated, and would be
dominated by private developers building for homeownership rather than housing
associations building for renters. In accordance with VROM’s objectives for these
concentration policies, a significant “value increment” has since developed between
protected agricultural land and greenfield sites available for development (Korthals Altes
2008, 12). Barrie Needham estimates that, all else being equal, urbanizable greenfield land
in the Netherlands now commands a price ten times higher than agricultural land
protected from development (personal communication, Barrie Needham, March 13,
2008). In the following section, I will explore the implications of these shifts in Dutch
growth management policy with respect to the problem framework introduced above.
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SECTION IV: INTERVIEW FINDINGS
Assessing Growth Management in the VINEX Era
Although VROM published a Fifth National Spatial Strategy in the year 2000,
implementation has been slow, and planning in the Netherlands is arguably still in the
midst of the VINEX era. Under the original VINEX report, development of the
“compact city” expansion areas was slated to commence in 1995 and to conclude in
2005. However, development started significantly behind schedule, and the timeline
for these projects has since been extended to the year 2010. As the implementation of
VINEX policy continues, analysts are busy comparing initial objectives to the results
taking shape on the ground.
Based on an analysis of land use change in the Green Heart and the Randstad
during the VINEX era, it would appear that growth management policies have been
largely successful in at least one respect: the protection of open space. By comparing
satellite imagery sensitive to land use changes during the period spanning 1995-2004,
Koomen et al (2008) determine that “in the Green Heart, as well as the Buffer zones,
the rate of urbanization has been much lower than in non-restrictive areas.” The
significance of this finding is heightened “when we realize that these areas are under a
higher than average urbanization pressure” (371). The authors attribute these results to
the rigidity and clarity of VROM’s restrictive zoning policies (374). Although it its too
early for a definitive analysis of VINEX policies, these initial findings suggest that the
newly “hardened” boundary surrounding the Green Heart and strict limitations on
rural development have been effective tools of growth management.
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The effects of VINEX policy on the development process are much less clearcut. It is safe to say, however, that the distribution of economic and political influence
amongst stakeholders in the development process has changed significantly in the past
two decades (RPB 2008, 2). Compared to the ministry that steered the “bundled
deconcentration” process by distributing subsidies to municipalities, VROM today
finds itself with much less ability to influence urbanization through stimulative
planning. For municipalities, the reduction of national influence via the “golden
strings” of governance is a mixed blessing, as increased political independence is
coupled with increased financial risk (Korthals Altes 2007). Private developers and
social housing associations are both stronger today than they were twenty years ago.
The “great miscalculation” of the early VINEX years gave rise to a large private
development sector that competes with municipalities and speculates on future
urbanization by acquiring and servicing greenfield land. While some of the larger and
wealthier municipal governments were able to maintain their local dominance by
quickly acquiring greenfield land in the mid-1990s, many smaller municipalities find
themselves effectively surrounded by private landholders looking to maximize their
involvement in future development. For their part, social housing associations find
themselves asset-rich with a great degree of operating freedom and a major role to
play in urban redevelopment (personal communication, Maarten Georgius, March 4,
2008).
In the political sphere surrounding spatial planning and development, the issue
of stagnant housing production has recently emerged as a major subject of concern.
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While demand for new units has surged during the VINEX era, the rate of housing
production has dropped to less than half the historic norms of the postwar period
(Korthals Altes 2008, 12). Although many are strategically well-positioned in the
market, private and social housing developers have failed to keep pace with the surge
in demand. As prices for ownership housing have skyrocketed, analysts have begun
searching for the root causes of the housing shortfall. A recent report commissioned
by VROM identified some 80 factors contributing to the problem of stagnant
production (Taskforce Woningbouwproductie, 2002). Some analysts primarily
attribute stagnation to a lack of available building sites, while others emphasize an
overabundance of procedural regulations or strategic rationing by dominant market
players.
To help make sense of Dutch growth management in the VINEX era, I will turn
now to a discussion of my interview findings. This section will proceed thematically,
addressing the subjects of land cost, housing cost, development density, and housing
affordability. In this discussion, I will address the research questions underpinning my
interviews without adhering rigidly to the framework presented in Section I.
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A Scarcity of Buildable Land
“There is, more or less, agreement that there is a scarcity of building land, for
better or for worse. […] That is the situation in this country. […] Where there’s
not agreement is whether [that scarcity] is a good thing or a bad thing, and what
should be done about it.”
—Barrie Needham, (personal communication, March 13, 2008)

Amongst the group of Dutch planning and housing experts that I interviewed,
there was general agreement that land available for development is scarce and
relatively expensive throughout the Randstad, and in other high-demand areas of the
Netherlands. Multiple interview subjects referenced the “value increment” between
agricultural and urbanizable greenfield land as evidence of that scarcity. In 2008,
researchers at the national government’s Institute for Spatial Research (Ruimtelijk
Planbureau, or RPB) found that agricultural land slated for future urban development
commanded a price eight times higher, on average, than similar land under permanent
agricultural protection (RPB 2008, 3). This is roughly consistent with Barrie
Needham’s 2008 estimate of a ten-fold increase in average land values associated with
permission to develop urban functions (personal communication, Barrie Needham,
March 13, 2008). Furthermore, Needham and the RPB analysts concur regarding the
existence of significant regional variations within the Netherlands, noting that in highdemand locations (e.g. at the borders of the Randstad), the value increment is
significantly higher.
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According to multiple interview subjects, there was little talk of value
increments in the Netherlands prior to the introduction of VINEX policy. However, in
the past 10-15 years, as a shortage of building land has become apparent, the value
increment has become a subject of significant discussion and debate in academic and
policy communities (personal communications, Barrie Needham, March 13, 2008;
Willem Korthals Altes, April 15, 2008; Willem van der Post, April 23, 2008). Much of
this discourse focuses on the economic effects of land scarcity. According to Willem
Korthals Altes, a scholar of spatial planning and economics, “The debate today
[regarding land scarcity] is different from fifteen, twenty years ago, when there was no
such debate. Because [at that time], there was much more balance between what you
call negative planning, and more positive planning about facilitating growth in places
where you want growth to be happening.” Recently, however, “There’s much more
debate about, ‘Is the planning system hindering growth? Is there enough space in the
plans for development?’ […] That debate is much stronger now in the last, say, ten
years” (personal communication, Willem Korthals Altes, April 15, 2008).

Stagnant Housing Production
The issue of land scarcity in the Netherlands has, in recent years, been
compounded by a shortfall of new housing production. According to policies
introduced in VINEX and updated in the report known as “What People Want, Where
People Live” (Remkes 2001), housing the growing Dutch population between the
years of 1995 and 2010 would require the production of approximately 100,000 new
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units each year (Boelhouwer 2005, 368). However, actual construction has fallen far
short of these targets, peaking at around 80,000 units in the late 1990s before falling to
60,000 in 2003. This figure represents the lowest level of housing production since
1952 (Boelhouwer et al 2006) and a drop of 35% from 1995 levels (Boelhouwer 2005,
365).
The same period saw an increase in real income in the Netherlands and a
decrease in interest rates, leading to a spike in purchasing power and demand for new
housing (Rouwendal et al 2004, 10). The combination of anemic housing production
and strong demand has lead, not surprisingly, to a surge in housing prices. Over the
period 1995-2003, average house prices rose 59% in real terms (Boelhouwer 2005,
365).

53

FIGURE 4: Housing Price and Production, 1965-2002

Price (black line) and production (red line) of owner-occupied housing in the
Netherlands, 1965-2002. Source: Boelhouwer 2005, 365.

Given the mismatch between housing demand and the production of new units,
the elasticity of housing supply is thought to be exceptionally low in the Netherlands.
According to a number of the economists I interviewed, the response of private
housing producers to price increases is, for all practical purposes, negligible. This
anecdotal evidence has been confirmed by researchers at the national government’s
Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, or CPB). Using a variety
of complementary analytic methods to estimate elasticity, CPB’s Wouter Vermeulen
and Jan Rouwendal (2007) find an average .04% increase in owner-occupier housing
construction in response to a 1% price increase in the same year, leading to the

54

conclusion that “housing supply in the Netherlands is almost fully inelastic in the
short-run.” (43). This finding raises many questions about the availability of input
factors to the development process (e.g. land, building rights, construction materials,
and labor), as well as the behavior of housing suppliers.
At the time of VINEX publication, VROM analysts expected the years from
1995-2010 to be characterized by strong economic growth and rising demand for
owner-occupied homes, bringing the annual target of 100,000 new units easily within
reach (Boelhouwer et al 2006, 301). In reality, economic growth and consumer
demand exceeded expectations, while housing production fell far short of VROM’s
targets. As a result, the issue of housing stagnation has been high on the agenda of
economists, planners, and policymakers since the beginning of the new millennium,
bringing back memories of the country’s postwar housing shortage. According to
Boelhouwer et al (2006), “Parliamentarians are racking their brains, trying to think up
new ways in which the government can kick-start the flagging engine of the housing
production. With large parts of the housing policy decentralized, simple solutions are
not just around the corner. The renewed spotlight on the housing shortage has taken
everyone more or less by surprise” (301).

Causes of Housing Stagnation
As they ponder rising housing prices and flagging production figures, the
question on the minds of analysts is: Why haven’t private housing developers
responded to price increases by building more new units? Perhaps not surprisingly,
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there are a wide variety of proposed answers to this question. In 2002, VROM
commissioned a task force to determine the principal causes of the stagnation problem
(Taskforce Woningbouwproductie, 2002). When the report came back, the task force
had identified some 80 factors as significant contributors to the housing shortfall
(personal communication, Dick Schuiling, May 19, 2008).
When discussing the root causes of housing stagnation, many interview
respondents identified a combination of disparate explanatory variables. However,
over the course of many interviews, patterns began to emerge in subjects’ responses,
providing the outlines of three distinct perspectives on the issue of housing stagnation.
I will present these three perspectives by discussing key interviews with representative
individuals. First, there were those analysts who emphasized a shortage of land
available for housing development in high-demand areas. Second, there were analysts
who focused on the procedural “red tape” that slows and complicates the processes of
planning and development. The third group of analysts referred to “organized
scarcity,” or the strategic rationing of housing production by powerful market actors,
as the primary cause of housing stagnation.

Land Availability
Gusta Renes, an economist at the national government’s Institute for Spatial
Research (Ruimtelijk Planbureau, or RPB), was the clearest advocate for the first
perspective, emphasizing issues of land supply above other explanations for housing
stagnation. In 2006, the national government’s Ministry of Finance requested an
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analysis of national spatial planning and its effects on housing prices in the owneroccupied sector. To fulfill this request, Renes and a team of RPB researchers used
national government databases to analyze variations in land value and housing
production across the Netherlands. During our interview, Ms. Renes summarized the
team’s findings regarding ownership housing in the private sector:
“When house prices increase, builders will be interested to make a profit, and
they will supply new housing. But you have to have land available. And
generally, in the Netherlands, what we found is that the regional differences in
the availability of land is enormous. When we compare where we build houses
and where the price increases were highest, they do not coincide. So we have
huge price increases in, for instance, Amsterdam. But we built houses in
Amersfoort [a town 50 km east of Amsterdam]” (personal communication,
Gusta Renes, April 28, 2008).
Analyzing national land and housing market data, the RPB analysts found a pattern of
constrained development in high-demand urban areas (e.g. the Randstad) matched
with an oversupply of buildable land in farther-flung communities, especially in the
north of the country. According to this analysis, the national supply of buildable land
cannot be said to constrain new housing development. However, in high-demand
urban areas, land supply was found to be insufficient to meet demands for new
housing (Renes et al 2006). According to Renes, the root of this problem is VROM’s
method of planning for housing development according to a national spatial strategy,
with little or no regard for market signals. Rather than recognizing high home prices as
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“revealed preferences” for a specific location, says Renes, VROM planners tend to
view prices merely as a reflection of income and interest rates. Thus, they fail to
provide housing in locations where it is most needed according to market preferences
(personal communication, Gusta Renes, April 28, 2008).
For Renes and the RPB researchers, these findings are significant primarily
because of their implications for national economic growth. The Randstad is the
economic hub of the Netherlands, and thus the site of dense business, service, and
industrial districts. Using Amsterdam as an example, Renes emphasized the
importance of productivity gains realized in these districts:
“We have a lot of economic growth in Amsterdam, and productivity is high in
Amsterdam because a lot of firms get together there. And you have knowledge
spillovers and [other] agglomeration economies. [...] And if you are not able to
build houses in these areas, that will cost you a lot of economic growth. Because
[employment will re-locate] to Almere, or Amersfoort, or wherever. And it will
be less productive there, because there are not a lot of firms available to work
with, for spillovers, or [other forms of agglomeration]. […] That means that if
you are containing the land in economic growth areas, you will restrict economic
growth, as well” (personal communication, Gusta Renes, April 28, 2008).
In addition to impacting firms’ capacity for economic productivity, the RPB team
found that national spatial planning has a negative impact on housing affordability.
While lower interest rates and higher incomes have offset national home price
increases for many buyers, Renes et al (2006) found that a problem of access to home
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ownership does exist in high-demand regions, especially for first-time buyers and
lower-middle income households. “These buyers must take out relatively high
mortgages and must build [up] significant capital if they are to eventually [pay off] the
mortgage. […] This can be a particular problem for low-income households and young
families, who in many cases will be accumulating negative equity” (Renes et al 2006,
3). Based on their findings of disproportionately high land rents in these same highdemand areas, the RPB researchers suggest that the lack of suitable development sites
in preferred areas contributes significantly to the problem of limited housing access.
When discussing the causes of housing supply stagnation, a number of other
interview subjects echoed the RPB team’s emphasis on land supply constraints. In
particular, respondents tended to emphasize the failure (or refusal) of national planners
to respond to housing market signals. Instead of developing the most desirable areas
first, planners channel housing to locations deemed “spatially appropriate.” The result,
according to these respondents, is an over-supply of land in the least desirable areas of
the country, while the number of parcels suitable for development within the Randstad
dwindles.
Interview respondents closely associated with the development sector noted the
increasing difficulty of development within Amsterdam and other high-demand
Randstad cities. By 2008, after more than a decade of concentration policy under
VINEX, most desirable infill sites had been developed, leaving only the most
challenging (and most expensive) sites to accommodate future development within the
built-up area of the Randstad (personal communication, Marten Georgius, March 4,
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2008; Ralph Ploeger, April 22, 2008). As a result, the development process is
becoming increasingly expensive, labor-intensive, and slow.

Red Tape and Development Delays
In its report on the causes of housing stagnation, the national government’s
Housing Production Task Force (Taskforce Woningbouwproductie, 2002) focused on
three principal factors: a) multiplicity, complexity, lack of transparency and
discretionary changes in policies and rules governing development; b) excessive local
government planning procedures; and c) insufficient personnel in public and private
organizations involved in planning and development (Korthals Altes 2006, 108). A
number of interview respondents referenced these findings directly when discussing
the problem of housing stagnation. For some analysts, the task force report seems to
have confirmed suspicions that the development process is being held up by a
combination of excessive red tape and a culture of planning via negotiation, which
demands significant human resource expenditure and injects uncertainty into the
development process.
Willem Korthals Altes is a planning scholar at Delft Technical University
focused primarily on the economic dimensions of Dutch spatial planning and housing
policies, and a proponent of one variation on the “red tape explanation” for housing
stagnation. According to Korthals Altes, much of the stagnation problem can be
explained by the expanded role of provincial spatial plans as “integrators” of disparate
policy objectives (Korthals Altes and Groetelaers 2007). While provincial
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governments have always had the power to review and deny municipal land use plans,
the past decade has seen a significant growth in the quantity and complexity of
development conditions imposed by provincial planners (Korthals Altes and
Groetelaers 2007, 7). Thus, municipal planners seeking provincial approval of local
development plans must now face an expanded list of requirements for plan approval.
Depending on the province, those requirements may include proof of compliance with
all applicable national and EU environmental laws, as well as statements pertaining to
geological factors, soil quality and chemistry, site heritage, and archaeological factors
(Korthals Altes and Groetelaers 2007, 7). An oversight in any one of these areas can
bring the permitting process to a halt, forcing developers and planners back to square
one. Citing his own recent research into the subject, Willem Korthals Altes estimated
that only 50% of all municipal development plans are approved outright by provincial
authorities, while 10% are rejected and 40% are given provisional approval, thus
requiring additional due diligence work and prolonging the approval procedure
(personal communication, April 15, 2008).
The problem of arduous permitting procedures is heightened by the third factor
presented by the Housing Production Task Force: insufficient planning and
development personnel. For much of the past decade, unemployment in the
Netherlands has been extremely low, leaving vacant many key positions in municipal
and provincial government, and in development firms responsible for housing
production (personal communication, Korthals Altes, April 15, 2008). This is
especially true in smaller jurisdictions, where limited planning staffs are frequently
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overwhelmed by the number of development plans requiring review (personal
communication, Dick Schuiling, May 19, 2008). In response to a question regarding
the supply of land available for development, University of Amsterdam housing
scholar Dick Schuiling mused, “Would it help if we had twice as much new [housing]
locations? Well, some say yes. Others say: we [would] have the same number of civil
servants…to handle all these building applications. So…get in line!” (personal
communication, May 19, 2008).
To summarize, these respondents portrayed housing stagnation as a result of
excessive procedural red tape, and a lack of sufficient personnel to cut through that red
tape. In an attempt to alleviate stagnation, the national and provincial governments
have recently dispatched special “housing boost teams,” consisting of civil servants
tasked with clearing up procedural blockages and streamlining development
negotiations (personal communication, Joline Santen, May 7, 2008). While the
efficacy of this form of procedural streamlining has yet to be determined, the response
by both national and provincial governments lends some credence to the argument that
red tape has significantly restricted timely housing development.

Organized Scarcity
According to Barrie Needham, there is a good deal of naiveté amongst
neoclassical economists regarding the likely effects of land market deregulation in the
Netherlands. A common assumption amongst these economists is that land releases
would result in rapid new development in large quantities, but Needham points to the
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case of Israel to demonstrate otherwise (personal communication, March 13, 2008). In
research published in 1998, Needham and Verhage found that private landowners in
Israel were well-positioned to carefully ration development, increasing development
profits by maintaining housing scarcity. Thus, in markets where buildable land is
scarce, maintaining that scarcity may be in the best interest of dominant market actors
(Needham and Verhage, 1998).
A certain amount of this “organized scarcity” already occurs in the Netherlands.
As Needham explained to me, “The development industry in this country, the
NEPROM – the Netherlands property development society – […] their members have
said: ‘obviously, we want to build more houses, but not too many more houses.’
Because they’ve got enormous reserves of land, which is not yet zoned for housing,
but that they hope will be zoned for housing, but—slowly. Because they don’t want to
damage their market” (personal communication, March 13, 2008). For this reason,
Needham says, developers in the Netherlands tend not to lobby very hard for land
market liberalization, as they prefer to increase the housing stock gradually. In fact, in
regions that see consistent housing price appreciation, private developers are known to
drag their heels during the development process in an effort to time the market and
deliver their products at the highest achievable price point (personal communication,
Dick Schuiling, May 19, 2008).
However, because of the unique division of responsibilities in the Dutch
development process, private parties are not alone in pursuing a strategy of rationed
development. Many of the larger municipal governments maintain a position of
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dominance in their local land market, allowing them to “organize scarcity” and drive
up the revenue-generating potential of public land development (personal
communication, Gusta Renes, April 28, 2008). A number of interview respondents
emphasized these monopolistic tendencies of municipal government, including one
planner from the municipality of Amsterdam (personal communication, Koos van
Zanen, March 11, 2008). According to Koos van Zanen, the scarcity of buildable land
in Amsterdam works to the benefit of both the municipality and private developers
(personal communication, March 11, 2008). High land costs allow the municipal
department of land development to do its work, capturing revenue needed to support
parks, transportation infrastructure, and social housing. Meanwhile, according to van
Zanen, land scarcity also maintains a favorable business environment for private land
developers:
“We [municipal planners] say what’s happening[…]And the interesting thing is
that the market stakeholders—they don’t feel bad about it. Free market
stakeholders, to a certain extent, want to be ruled by a Big Brother. We, as a Big
Brother, we make the [land] scarcity. And what’s better for the market than
scarcity? […] If we keep[…]the scarcity up[…]the market stakeholders [can
make] the most profit of it. It [may seem] the other way around—that by having
space, you can do what you want and make money. But we say, ‘by having no
space, you can also make money.’ […] And I think it’s the truth” (personal
communication, Koos van Zanen, March 11, 2008).
According to a number of interview subjects, this strategy of organizing scarcity —
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practiced by private and public landowners alike — is the primary cause of stagnant
housing production.

Density of Development
In the problem framework that guides this research, I state “planners and
policymakers may be able to stem housing price inflation by allowing or encouraging
significant density increases within the area available for development.” This
statement is based on the notion of a “density offset,” a theory rooted in classical
urban economics that is often advanced by proponents of growth management.
According to the classical economic theory of factor substitution, housing producers
tend to respond to higher land costs by reducing lot sizes and shifting development to
housing types that consume less land per unit.13 As noted in Section I, this theory has
prompted planners and policymakers in the United States to incorporate tools
promoting density increases into some growth management policies in a bid to
mitigate land price increases.
During the interviews I conducted in the Netherlands, I asked respondents a
variety of questions related to the “density offset” theory. Namely, I attempted to
discover whether Dutch housing producers tend to increase development densities in
response to land cost increases. Furthermore, I wanted to know whether and how
planning powers may be used to compel housing density increases.
When discussing the economic relationship between land prices and
development density, interview subjects described a far more complex dynamic than
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the classical “factor substitution” model would suggest. In the Netherlands, as in the
United States, the relationship between land and housing markets is mediated by land
use law, which places conditions on the right to develop. Those conditions may
include matters such as the function, form, density, and type of development.
However, in the Netherlands, such conditions are often not codified in zoning plans
covering large areas. Rather, municipal planners prefer to zone large areas at the
globaal (approximate) level, keeping parameters for development as general as
possible (Needham 2007, 130-133). Such globaal plans can specify which details
remain to be worked out before a building permit can be granted. When development
is proposed within the plan area, those details become the subject of negotiations
between municipal planners and developers. In this way, a great deal of municipal
planning takes place at the level of individual developments, through a process of
direct negotiation. By committing only to general land use parameters at the outset of
negotiations, municipal planners increase the number of variables up for negotiation
and improve their bargaining position relative to developers (personal communication,
Barrie Needham, March 13, 2008).
According to Barrie Needham, because of this practice of site-specific planning,
“zoning in terms of minimum or maximum density is…not the practice. Because the
details—and these would include the details of the density—get worked out, very
often, in negotiations. Not within the zoning plan” (personal communication, June 11,
2008). These negotiations can include any and all dimensions of the land use plan, and
are bound only by the requirement that nothing can be specified which is not “spatially
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relevant” (Needham 2007, 130). Although I interviewed a number of planners and
municipal officials who frequently participate in such negotiations, I was not able to
determine how development density interacts with other variables at play in the
negotiation phase of municipal planning.
To further complicate matters, in cases of municipal land ownership—which are
frequent—the land price may also be subject to negotiation, as planners frequently
elect to subsidize certain forms of development through discounted land preparation
services. In these cases, the municipality plays multiple roles—land supplier, land
developer, and regulator of development—and exercises a large degree of influence
over land prices. Because of this concentration of responsibilities in the hands of
municipal planners, I was not able to draw any general conclusions regarding a
market-based relationship between land price and housing density. Barrie Needham
suggested that my confusion on this matter is common to analysts attempting to apply
classical economic assumptions to Dutch land use planning and development
processes. As Needham put it, the “very confusing division of responsibilities” in the
land and housing development process tends to scramble common assumptions about
supply and demand relationships, and thus renders many classical economic models
useless (personal communication, March 13, 2008). Given the practice of planning via
negotiation, Needham suggested that development density is better understood as a
product of complex political processes rather than “pure” market forces. A number of
other interview respondents echoed this sentiment, describing housing density as a
subject of shifting municipal planning priorities, rather than an expression of land
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market dynamics.

The State of Low-Income Housing
The experts I interviewed expressed significant concern regarding the recent
trends of rapid housing appreciation coupled with falling housing production. In
voicing their concerns, many respondents spoke in terms of systemic health, arguing
that the low elasticity of housing supply signaled a “dysfunctional housing system,” or
a housing market that is “out of balance.” Others, such as Gusta Renes, advanced more
pointed critiques couched in terms of economic efficiency. These respondents tended
to portray the problem of housing stagnation as a threat to national economic
productivity, or as a cause of inefficient side effects such as increased commuting
between cities. However, despite the universal recognition of a significant housing
shortfall, I heard very little concern for the housing conditions of low-income
populations. In general, respondents did not describe housing stagnation as a threat to
housing equity.
One potential explanation for this lies in the divorce of the spatial planning and
social housing systems. Without a doubt, Dutch planners are far less engaged in
promoting housing affordability since the privatization of social housing associations
and the end of “bundled deconcentration.” It might be argued that spatial planners in
the Netherlands no longer see affordability as an issue of their concern. But in
actuality, this was not the impression I received from interview subjects. Rather,
respondents tended to believe that, in spite of the shortfall in overall housing
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production, low-income households continue to be well served by social housing
providers and by the central government’s supplementary system of housing
allowances. According to respondents, the systemic dysfunction of the housing market
is simply not “filtering down” to significantly impact low-income households.
A number of respondents, including two housing experts based in Amsterdam,
argued that the major cities of the Randstad currently have an overabundance of
housing units targeted to low-income renters. Floris Blom is a senior policy advisor at
the municipality of Amsterdam’s Department of Housing (Dienst Wonen). According
to Blom, organized citizens and elected officials in Amsterdam have consistently
lobbied for affordable housing, resulting in a particularly large supply of social
housing within the municipality’s stock. In the current era, a combination of municipal
cross-subsidy programs and direct subsidies from the central government provides
ample funding for the municipality’s affordable housing programs. Blom told me that,
thanks largely to close partnerships with strong social housing developers, organizing
sufficient low-income housing production “just isn’t that challenging any more” for
the municipality. In fact, the capacity of Amsterdam’s low-income housing stock
significantly exceeds the size of the low-income population it is meant to serve
(personal communication, Floris Blom, April 29, 2008).
Dick Schuiling, a housing expert at the University of Amsterdam, was careful to
point out the exceptional nature of Amsterdam, which is the wealthiest and most
politically powerful municipal government in the Netherlands. While municipal
planners in Amsterdam continue to operate like “the good old days”—subsidizing
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social housing development through discounted land preparation—most municipalities
in the Netherlands can no longer afford to play such an active role in social housing
development. However, Needham also confirmed Floris Blom’s more general
argument regarding the excess supply of low-cost rental housing in Amsterdam, and in
most major cities in the Randstad (personal communication, Dick Schuiling, May 19,
2008). Indeed, on a national scale, social housing constitutes 36% of the housing
stock, while just 28% of Dutch households fall into the social sector’s target income
group (Milligan et al 2006, 241).14
According to Floris Blom, Amsterdam’s continued success in providing
adequate affordable housing is due, in large part, to the financial strength of the social
housing sector. In times when municipal budgets are tight and affordable housing
production is threatened, social housing associations are generally willing and able to
increase their own capital investments to keep construction on track (personal
communication, Floris Blom, April 29, 2008.) This perception—of social housing
associations flush with available capital—was common amongst interview
respondents, and not without reason. Value estimates of the social housing sector’s
collective holdings range from 22 to 24 billion Euros — figures which speak to the
Dutch government’s substantial historic investment into social housing (Boelhouwer
2005, 371; Priemus 2003, 330).
Hugo Priemus of the Delft Technical University is generally considered to be the
nation’s leading expert on housing issues. In a 2003 evaluation of the Dutch social
housing sector, Priemus found that, while conditions vary for individual housing
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associations, “the Netherlands social housing sector is on a firm financial footing…No
country in Western, Central, or Eastern Europe has professional private housing
associations with such large amounts of capital at their disposal” (338; 349).
Furthermore, Priemus found that affordable housing providers continued to serve their
core function well, providing technically sound and well-maintained housing to
vulnerable groups. Thus, “it can be concluded that social housing in the Netherlands is
effective in meeting public tasks” (340). The question, for Priemus, is whether such a
robust system of affordable housing production is still needed in the Netherlands.
“Although the large scale of the social rental sector can be accounted for historically,
that is not to say that the current high market share of 37 per cent [of the national
housing stock] can be justified. […] The Netherlands is one of the most prosperous
countries in the world and household incomes and capital are rising inexorably. The
social rental sector in the Netherlands is actually so differentiated and so attractive, not
only do low-income groups live in it, but also middle and higher-income groups”
(330).
Echoing Priemus’ analysis, the experts I spoke with portrayed the Dutch social
housing system as financially sound, politically powerful, and highly competent in
providing high-quality housing to low-income households. Furthermore, respondents
emphasized the importance of ample support available to vulnerable families in the
form of direct aid from the central government. Since discontinuing supply-side
subsidies to housing producers, the national government has invested heavily in a
means-tested system of rent rebates provided directly to low- and moderate-income
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households.15 Between 1984 and 1999, expenditure on these demand-side subsidies
increased 170 fold in nominal dollars, so that by 1999, some 15.5% of all Dutch
households received some form of rent rebate from the national government (Milligan
et al 2006, 242). According to Dick Schuiling, approximately 30% of renters of social
housing also receive rent rebates (personal communication, May 19, 2008).

The Gap in the Middle
Describing the strength of Dutch social housing and rent support does not tell the
whole story of housing affordability in the Netherlands. While the majority (54.6%) of
low-income households live in social housing, 12.3% of such households find housing
on the private rental market and 42.1% opt for home ownership (Milligan et al 2006,
246). In a 2003 assessment of low-income housing in the Netherlands, University of
Sydney researcher Vivienne Milligan found that “many low-income households in the
Netherlands have reasonable affordability ratios by international standards” (246).
However, Milligan et al found significant differences in average housing expenditure
according to tenure. While low-income households living in social housing spent a
reasonable 26.5% of disposable income on rent, those living in private-market housing
tended to be significantly worse off. Low-income home purchasers (i.e. those with a
mortgage) had an average housing expenditure ratio of 36.8%, while low-income
households in the private rental sector spent 30.2% of disposable income on rent
(246).
These findings confirm the reports I heard from interview respondents, who
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often spoke of a “gap in the middle” of the Dutch structure of housing support. When
asked to identify the most vulnerable groups on the housing market, respondents
invariably pointed to lower-middle income households, young families, and starters on
the private market. According to my respondents, while the poorest households tend to
be particularly well-served by the combination of social housing and rent vouchers,
households attempting to move out of social housing and into private home ownership
must amass a sizable down payment, which is often beyond their reach. These are the
same households of concern for Gusta Renes, who argues that accumulating negative
equity is a significant problem for many starters on the private market (Renes et al
2006, 3). According to Dick Schuiling, a problem of housing access has developed in
recent years, in which many lower- and lower-middle income households that would
prefer to buy a home are forced to remain in social housing. “Because their rents are
low and the quality of [social] housing is high, it’s hard to call this a problem of strict
affordability. But [with] housing choice…housing access? There, we have a problem”
(personal communication, Dick Schuiling, May 19, 2008).

Findings Summary
Amongst the group of Dutch planning and housing experts that I interviewed,
there was general agreement that land available for development is scarce and
relatively expensive in high-demand areas of the Netherlands. When our discussions
turned to the causes and implications of land scarcity, responses tended to be more
varied. Many of the experts I spoke with noted that developable land was more readily
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available fifteen to twenty years ago, and a number of respondents characterized land
scarcity as an intended effect of growth management policies under VINEX.
Regarding the subject of housing stagnation, the only truly universal sentiment
amongst respondents was that the shortfall of housing is an exceedingly complex
phenomenon, likely caused by a variety of interactive variables. However, despite the
diversity of individual explanations for the phenomenon, I was able to identify three
distinct perspectives on housing stagnation: one emphasizing a shortage of building
sites due to national spatial planning regulations, another highlighting the combination
of red tape and personnel shortfall, and a third focused on oligopolistic behavior of
powerful market actors. Given the depth of support for each of these positions, it
seems likely that all three explanations have some validity, describing real dimensions
of the housing stagnation phenomenon.
My findings were largely inconclusive regarding the relevance of a “density
offset” effect as a response to land price increases in the Netherlands. Due to the
complex division of labor within the Dutch development process, I was not able to
discern any market-based relationship between land prices and housing densities.
Barrie Needham suggested that this is a common problem when applying classical
economic models to the Dutch development process, and that development density is
better understood as a product of policy decisions than of “pure” land- and housingmarket interactions. However, because the majority of those policy decisions take
place in the context of site-specific planning negotiations, I was not able to discern
much about whether or how the variables of land cost and building density might be
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related.
Finally, I found that respondents tended not to portray the housing shortfall as a
threat to housing equity. Respondents asserted that, despite the recent decline in
overall housing production, low-income households continue to be well served by
social housing providers and by central government housing allowances. Indeed,
analyses suggest that the social housing sector is financially sound, politically
powerful, and highly competent in providing high-quality housing to low-income
households. However, a significant number of lower-middle income families seem to
fall into the “gap in the middle” of the Dutch structure of housing support. When
asked to identify the most vulnerable groups on the housing market, respondents
consistently pointed to lower-middle income households, many of which would prefer
to move from the social housing sector into private home ownership. The high cost of
private housing often precludes this, suggesting that housing choice and accessibility
may be limited for some groups in the Netherlands, even if housing quality and
affordability are reasonable by international standards.
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SECTION V: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Broad Support for Growth Management

“There is a great consensus—a remarkable political consensus—in this country,
that land use planning is useful. And the radical critiques [of planning] which
you find…in the States, and to some extent in England, are just absent here.”
—Barrie Needham (personal communication, June 11, 2008)

In the United States and the UK, the neoclassical critique of growth management
policy has often been cited as justification for the deregulation of land and housing
markets. Based on the argument that such regulations drive up land and housing costs,
campaigns against regulatory growth management have taken up the banner of
preserving affordable housing opportunities. At times, economists themselves have
joined these efforts, arguing that housing markets can be improved in terms of both
efficiency and equity by reducing regulatory barriers and increasing consumer choice
with regard to the location, type, and price of housing.
Amongst the Dutch experts that I interviewed, I found widespread agreement
regarding the high cost of land available for development in the Netherlands. Most
respondents believed that national spatial planning policies make buildable land more
expensive, and a number of respondents argued that such policies reduce consumer
choice and create barriers to home ownership for certain segments of the market. In
this way, respondents shared many of the same concerns as neoclassical critics of
growth management. However, calls for broad-scale deregulation of the land and
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housing markets were notably absent from the discussions I had with Dutch planners,
economists, and housing experts. Instead, I heard widespread support for the
fundamental objectives of growth management and select arguments for limited policy
reform.

The Planning Perspective
During interviews with practicing planners and scholars of Dutch spatial
planning, I was struck by repeated assertions of universal support for open space
preservation policies. Time and again, I was told that “everyone agrees” regarding the
importance of protecting the Green Heart and containing urban development.
According to a number of respondents, this base of support extends far beyond the
community of spatial planners, and includes private stakeholders and small
municipalities with ambitions to grow. Maarten Nip, a regional planner with the
Amsterdam Metropolitan Area, explained the consensus regarding open space
preservation in terms of broader societal values: “It’s deeply rooted in the culture. It’s
not so much consensus between different political parties—[where] one party wants
that and the other one something else, and then they agree—no it’s really a deeperrooted, and very important [idea]…[Dutch city-dwellers] feel it’s very important that
it’s possible to go on bike, and in twenty minutes, you’re in a green area” (personal
communication, Maarten Nip, May 21, 2008).
While I was unable to independently verify the support for open space
preservation amongst all relevant stakeholder groups, I came away from my
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interviews convinced that the objective of Green Heart preservation is alive and well
in the Netherlands. It would seem that planners, in particular, continue to strongly
support the “doctrine” of open space preservation promulgated by VROM, as
described by Faludi and van der Valk (1994). However, I also found planners to be
strikingly open regarding the costs and consequences associated with preserving the
Green Heart. In particular, planners tended to quickly acknowledge the inflationary
effect of national open space preservation on land prices. And, while some argued that
the issue of housing shortage is a perennial problem in the Netherlands—a fact of life
in a nation with limited dry land and a growing population—a number of planners
asserted a direct connection between the recent housing shortfall and the strictures of
the spatial planning system.
Amongst these respondents, the problem of housing stagnation was seen as an
unintended consequence of national spatial planning; a policy outcome that decision
makers can and should influence through policy reform. In the meantime, these
respondents tended to be extremely supportive of, and grateful for, the existence of the
social housing system and the national government’s demand-side housing assistance.
It seems that these systems function as a vital safety net, not only for the households
they serve, but also for planners and policymakers shaping land and housing
development. Because the social housing system continues to provide high-quality
housing at reasonable rents, planners and policy makers are able to pursue ambitious
spatial and environmental objectives, secure in the knowledge that vulnerable
populations will be largely shielded from any unintended policy consequences.
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On the whole, then, the perspective of planning professionals seemed to be that
growth management policies reflect deep and widely held values attached to open
space and the preservation of agricultural and natural areas. Planners tended to
acknowledge that these policies come at a cost, specifically in the form of land value
inflation and, for some, housing price increases. Rather than undermining support for
growth management, these costs were regarded pragmatically, as the subjects of
needed policy reform. Finally, planners took pains to point out the efficacy of various
forms of housing support, which prevent vulnerable populations from bearing the
unintended costs of growth management.

An Alternative Economic Perspective
After a handful of interviews with Dutch economists and planners, I began to
notice an interesting pattern. When discussing the interaction between land and
housing markets, respondents tended to reverse the direction of causation that I was
accustomed to. That is, instead of treating land cost as an independent variable with
significant impact on average housing costs, respondents tended to portray land costs
as a function of housing market dynamics. In fact, on more than one occasion, an
interview subject paused to correct my mistaken understanding of Dutch market
dynamics. During my first formal interview, VROM policy analyst Arjen van der
Burg stated simply: “the point is not, in itself, that […] say, concentration policies or
restrictive policies, drive up land prices. They drive up housing prices. […] The level
of housing prices is very high in most areas. And that makes land also expensive”
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(personal communication, February 28, 2008).
My own understanding of housing markets was based primarily on neoclassical
studies from the American and British literatures on planning and economics. These
studies tended to assume open and competitive markets, and often emphasized the
effects of supply-side variables on average housing prices. Such supply-side variables
include the price of land, construction costs, and credit conditions. In many
neoclassical analyses of land use planning, particularly in the US literature,
construction costs and credit conditions are held constant, bringing land costs into
focus as a primary determinant of home prices.16 Boelhouwer (2005) nicely
summarizes this perspective:
The [mainstream neoclassical] approach sees the housing market as differing
little from other markets, where prices are determined mainly by supply and
demand. […] It is implicitly assumed here that the housing market operates as a
supply market. […] The idea behind this supply-directed approach is that in the
long term the price of newly built housing follows the production costs. The
factors that determine the costs of new building (including land and construction
costs) mark the starting point for a new price equilibrium. We find this pattern
most clearly in the United States, where various researchers have demonstrated a
strong relationship between trends in building costs and house prices.” (367)
This emphasis on building costs is evident in the problem framework that guides this
research, in which I state, “by increasing the cost of land, regulatory growth
management policies may significantly increase average housing costs.” By contrast,
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the Dutch economists I interviewed tended to emphasize the market dynamics within
the existing housing stock when discussing average housing prices. According to this
perspective, land costs follow broader housing market dynamics, and are generally
assumed to have little or no independent impact on average housing costs (personal
communication, Arjen van der Burg, February 28, 2008).
Upon researching this issue further, I discovered a much broader trend amongst
Dutch economists and planners: a frequent objection to neoclassical explanations for
Dutch land and housing market dynamics. According to a number of economists,
neoclassical models are simply a poor fit for the highly regulated land and housing
markets of the Netherlands (Rouwendal et al, 2004; Vermeulen and Rouwendal 2007;
Boelhouwer, 2005; Boelhouwer et al 2006; Needham and Verhage 1998; Needham
1992). Because municipal governments have traditionally played a dominant role in
supplying buildable land in the Netherlands, land supply is best understood as a policy
outcome, rather than a product of open market transactions (Needham and Verhage
1998). A similar argument has been made with regard to the limitations on
developable land imposed by national planning directives (personal communication,
Gusta Renes, April 28, 2008). “In this system, the supply of residential land is indeed
a government affair, and market signals can have effects only to the extent that
government institutions are sensitive to them” (Vermeulen and Rouwendal 2007, 20).
Thus, the assumption of open and competitive land markets, which underpins classical
urban economics, is extremely problematic in the Netherlands.
In place of classical assumptions regarding open markets, Dutch economists tend
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to focus on the policy decisions that influence land and housing supplies. In a 1992
article, Barrie Needham developed a theory of land price dynamics in markets where
land is supplied publicly. Focusing on the effects of land use law and planning
practice, Needham states: “It is apparent that whenever the supply of building land is
dominated by municipalities, political decisions have an important effect on land
prices. They affect both the upper and lower limits of the range within which land
prices can be expected to fall…and the actual position within the range” (675).
Needham goes on to identify six specific political variables with significant impact on
land prices. In addition to decisions regarding the amount of buildable land supplied,
these key political variables include the content and application of compulsory
purchase law (i.e. powers of eminent domain); the possibility of subsidizing the land
development process; the chosen mix of land uses in the plan area; the quality of land
servicing; and the possibility of selling prepared land at a discount (Needham 1992,
675-77).
In the years since Needham’s article was published, much has changed in the
Netherlands, particularly with regard to the relative market influence of municipal
governments and private land developers. It might be argued that the growth of private
land development has moved the Netherlands away from Needham’s model of public
land supply, and toward the type of open and competitive land market assumed by
classical economists. When asked whether the developments of the past decade had
fundamentally changed the nature of Dutch land and housing markets in this way,
Gusta Renes acknowledged the growing influence of private stakeholders over the
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content of spatial plans in certain regional markets. However, Renes argued, when
seen from an international perspective, “the influence of the [national] government on
numbers and prices and quality [of houses] is still very, very high [in the
Netherlands]” (personal communication, April 28, 2008). Renes went on to argue that
the national government’s spatial planning system continues to set the parameters of
land development in terms of both quantity and location: while the VINEX years have
seen greater participation by private land developers, the borders of the Green Heart
have been maintained, and new urbanization has largely followed VROM’s national
spatial plans (personal communication, April 28, 2008). Other contemporary Dutch
economists would seem to agree with Renes, recognizing a rise in private development
activity while continuing to view national land supply as a policy outcome
(Rouwendal et al, 2004; Vermeulen and Rouwendal 2007; Boelhouwer, 2005;
Boelhouwer et al 2006).
It is important to note that this emphasis on policy decisions does not imply a
total rejection of market forces. Rather, in the case of housing, Dutch economists seem
to prefer a model in which market forces are expressed through a process of stock
adjustment (Needham and Verhage 1998, Boelhouwer 2005, Boelhouwer et al 2006,
Renes et al 2006). At the core of this theory stands the notion that markets for durable
goods (e.g., housing) must be modeled differently than markets for non-durables, in
which prices are dominated by supply of, and demand for, new products (Needham
and Verhage 1998, 35). When applied to housing markets, the stock adjustment model
highlights the proportionally large stock of existing housing. Ultimately, it is argued,
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the dynamics within the market for existing housing have a far greater influence on
average housing prices than does the supply of new units (personal communication,
Barrie Needham, March 13, 2008; Boelhouwer 2005, 367). For this reason, it makes
little sense to treat land supply and construction costs as significant determinants of
average housing costs. According to the stock adjustment model, “often the opposite
effect occurs, with new home prices following the prices for existing stock, as it is the
latter that determine how much scope a builder has to sell a home of a particular
quality at an appropriate price” (Boelhouwer 2005, 367).

Applications to the Research Subject
When early interviews first exposed me to alternative conceptions of the
relationship between land and housing markets, the broader implications of these ideas
were not immediately clear to me. However, as I discovered more about Dutch
critiques of neoclassical models, and about the stock adjustment model for housing
markets, I realized that the perspective offered by my interview subjects addressed
many of the core issues of my research framework.
From the classical economic perspective, land prices typically reflect a
combination of location characteristics and the value of realized and potential land
uses (Adams and Watkins 2002, 246). The Dutch economists I encountered were
explicit in their rejection of these principles of land valuation, arguing that
development locations and land uses are highly influenced by policy decisions in the
Netherlands (see, for example, Vermeulen and Rouwendal 2007, 43-44). As Needham
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has noted, Dutch land policy has been employed “in the service of, and an instrument
for, [both] housing and town planning policy” (1988, 48). Policy decisions thus set the
upper and lower limits of land prices, and often determine land prices directly.
According to my respondents, to the extent that market forces influence land prices, it
is the value of the existing housing stock that determines land prices, not the other way
around. Taken together, these arguments minimize the determinative impact of the
land market on average home prices. By extension, these arguments also undermine
the neoclassical critique of growth management policy, which is based on the notion
of land price as an independent variable with significant impact on average housing
prices.
The perspective offered by my interview subjects is significantly distinct from
the mainstream neoclassical treatment of growth management policy. Neoclassical
economists tend to favor comparative static models of land and housing markets,
contrasting economic outcomes with and without public intervention. Adams and
Watkins (2002) summarize the strengths and limitations of this approach when applied
to land use planning:
The comparative static model…allows us to theorize the impacts of imposing
planning constraints on a previously unfettered market. This provides a useful
theoretical guide to the likely distributional effects of planning intervention.
However, the empirical research cannot replicate this comparative analysis. The
planning system was in place throughout the study periods. As such it is difficult
to assess the impact of planning intervention because we cannot do a ‘before and
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after’ experiment. (256)
Limitations notwithstanding, this theoretical model is common in American economic
and planning studies. Often, a pre-existing open market is assumed or stipulated,
which is subsequently altered by public intervention, for better or for worse.
For reasons alluded to in the analysis above, this formulation of state-market
relations did not have much traction amongst the Dutch planners and economists that I
interviewed. Whereas the mainstream neoclassical perspective is based on an
autonomous and unfettered land market model, my respondents described Dutch land
and housing markets as being defined by policy objectives and the institutional
framework of governance. In this way, rather than assuming a pre-existing “natural
state” of open market transactions, my respondents placed public actions in advance of
market dynamics.
Given the long tradition of municipal land preparation in the Netherlands,
perhaps this finding is not so surprising. For centuries, public entities have been active
in supplying land for development. Throughout much of the twentieth century, public
power over land supply was used to achieve a wide array of policy objectives,
including both growth management and housing affordability. Today, VROM
continues to set the bounds of the national land market through open space
preservation policy. Given this history, it is not surprising that Dutch analysts tend to
reject the notion of a pre-existing, unfettered land market, and instead choose to focus
on the institutional arrangements which structure market behavior.

86

Policy Implications
In their analysis of housing supply elasticity, Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2007)
conclude that the response of Dutch housing producers to price signals is negligible in
the short, medium, and long terms (43). The authors contextualize this finding through
an overview of major public policies affecting land and housing markets over the
course of recent decades: “An important element in these interventions appears to be
the regulation of land use, so that the supply of residential land is legally a government
decision, rather than a market outcome. Consequently, the [extremely low] supply
elasticities estimated in this paper should be interpreted predominantly as a measure
for the responsiveness of these institutions to price signals” (44). This concluding
statement expresses one version of a common argument advanced by many of the
economists I encountered: given the degree of public involvement in land and housing
markets, policymakers and other architects of the spatial planning system bear
significant responsibility for recent housing stagnation.
For adherents to the stock adjustment model of housing markets, stagnant
production can be traced to various forms of systemic constraint. While an efficient
stock adjustment process will see the market price of new homes come to reflect
production costs, it is possible for systemic constraints to prevent stock adjustment
and inflate prices. “That could be constraints on the capacity of the producers of new
goods, keeping the flow of supply below the flow of demand, or a few producers
restraining supply in their own interest” (Needham and Verhage 1998, 35). In Section
IV, I presented the three explanations for housing stagnation offered most frequently
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by interview subjects: limited land availability, red tape and development delays, and
organized scarcity. Within the broader literature on Dutch housing production, these
factors and a handful of others are widely discussed as important systemic constraints.
Responses to the problem of housing stagnation seek to increase the
responsiveness of public institutions to market signals, and to remove sources of
systemic constraint on housing production. To this end, specific suggestions for policy
reform include regulatory streamlining and the boosting of private and non-profit
housing production capacity. Several experts I encountered would like to see an
increase in “positive planning” and a return to more active municipal land and housing
development. Finally, to bring demand in line with the available housing stock, many
experts believed that the national mortgage interest tax deduction should be reduced or
abolished in order to minimize its inflationary effect on housing demand.17
During my interviews and in my review of the broader literature on housing
supply stagnation, calls for broad-scale deregulation of buildable land supply were
notably rare. As described above, prohibitive land price was generally not considered
to be a significant cause of housing stagnation. Furthermore, the stock adjustment
perspective tends to downplay the impact of the marginal increases in new home
production that might be realized via land supply deregulation. As a number of
interview subjects argued, in a market dominated by the sale of existing homes,
marginal additions to the supply of new homes would be unlikely to significantly
impact average housing prices (Boelhouwer 2005, 367). Barrie Needham was most
explicit in advancing this counter-argument to land release; a course of action which
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he suggested would effectively increase profits for private developers while failing to
significantly impact consumers’ housing costs (personal communication, March 13,
2008). In support of this position, Needham cited English studies of land release
scenarios, which bear out his claims of minimal price impact. In research described as
“arguably the most sophisticated and comprehensive attempt to quantify the impacts
of the [English] planning system on the housing market,” Bramley (1993a; 1993b)
found that, in response to a doubling of buildable land supply, average home prices
would fall by less than 10% in the long term (Adams and Watkins 2002, 253). In a
final report on Bramley’s research, the sponsoring Joseph Rowntree Foundation
(1994) concluded, “large land releases are ineffective and environmentally damaging
ways to reduce prices” (30). The impact of land releases on average home prices is
thought to be limited, in large part, by the tendency for housing producers to “organize
scarcity.” As discussed in Section IV, landowners and developers have an economic
incentive to gradually increase housing supply, maintaining relative scarcity even
when developable land is readily available. In this way, landowner behavior mediates
the relationship between land supply and housing production, and tendencies toward
oligopoly curtail the price impacts of land release.
Of all the experts I interviewed, Gusta Renes and Wouter Vermeulen were most
supportive of land market deregulation. For both Renes and Vermeulen, an adequate
supply of “properly sited” and readily buildable land parcels is understood as one
aspect of housing production capacity. From this perspective, a shortage of available
land can reduce production capacity, placing a constraint on the stock adjustment
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process and leading to housing price inflation. Indeed, both Renes and Vermeulen
argued that national land use planning constrains housing supply in just this way.
However, in their recommendations for policy reform, Renes and Vermeulen
both stopped well short of suggesting that national land use planning ought to be
dissolved altogether. For Renes, the key to long-term market stabilization and
decreased housing price inflation is to permit and encourage the building of adequate
numbers of new housing in the high-demand areas of the Randstad (personal
communication, April 28, 2008). This implies a relaxation of both procedural and
geographic limitations currently placed on development. In addition to requiring an
increase in the ratio of residential to industrial area within built-up areas, Renes
believes that some expansion of urbanized areas into currently protected green zones
is necessary in high-demand regions. Renes also argued that both housing and
employment markets could be significantly improved by boosting investment in intraregional transportation infrastructure, which would allow for more efficient
commuting within the regional market (personal communication, April 28, 2008). For
his part, Wouter Vermeulen was less explicit in his suggestions for policy reform, but
implied that eliminating systemic constraints and significantly increasing housing
production would require a combination of increased land availability, increased
municipal “positive planning” and development, and regulatory streamlining during
the planning and permitting processes (personal communication, June 26, 2008).
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SECTION VI: CONCLUSION
Research Summary
This case study explores Dutch spatial planning with reference to the American
academic literature on systems of growth management. My initial research objective
was to describe the Dutch approach to spatial planning, focusing on issues of
developable land supply, development density, and housing affordability. In particular,
I hoped to describe Dutch efforts to simultaneously promote housing affordability and
compact development, and to highlight any planning practices or policy tools used to
coordinate those objectives. With those research objectives in mind, I have explored a
single overarching research question: How do planners and policymakers in the
Netherlands conceptualize and manage the relationship between land and housing
markets, and the effects of that relationship on housing affordability?
During the era of “bundled deconcentration,” planners and policymakers at the
national and municipal levels of Dutch government balanced stimulative and
regulatory approaches to growth management, encouraging new development in
strategic growth centers while protecting open space in the Green Heart. By providing
urbanizable land in quantities sufficient to meet local demands for new development,
planners and policymakers prevented significant inflation of urbanizable land values.
In connection with this strategy of land provision, national housing policy was
supported through a combination of discounted land preparation services and direct
subsidies, fueling the growth of Europe’s most extensive social housing sector. In this
way, it seems that any negative equity impacts that might have resulted from
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regulatory growth management were sufficiently mitigated via massive investments in
affordable housing.
In the climate of fiscal austerity that defined the recession decade of the 1980s,
the strategic alliance between social housing and spatial planning dissolved, and the
era of “bundled deconcentration” came to an end. Then, in the early 1990s,
environmental concerns came to dominate the agenda of national planners, and the
provision of land sufficient to meet housing demand ceased to be an objective of
spatial planning. VINEX ushered in the “compact city” era of national planning,
concentrating development in and around existing city centers while simultaneously
“hardening” the boundary of the Green Heart and strengthening growth limitations in
rural communities. As a result, a significant value increment developed for the first
time in the Netherlands, so that land permitted for urban development now commands
a price eight to ten times higher than comparable land located in protected areas.
While the demand for new housing has surged during the VINEX years,
housing producers have failed to keep pace. Housing stagnation and the attendant
spike in home prices have become issues of significant concern in recent years, and
both researchers and policymakers are working to diagnose the problem and offer
solutions. While contributing factors abound, the group of experts I interviewed
identified three principal causes of housing stagnation: insufficient land availability,
red tape and procedural delays during planning and development, and the tendency for
producers to organize scarcity in their own economic interest.
Despite their significant concern for these issues, respondents did not portray
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housing stagnation as a threat to housing equity. Instead, they expressed confidence in
the national system of housing support, which combines an abundant social housing
supply with rent subsidies to provide low- and moderate-income households with
affordable, high-quality housing. In this way, Dutch citizens continue to benefit from
historic investments in the stock of affordable housing, and from ongoing investments
in the system of rent subsidies. However, interview respondents also agreed that
housing choice and access are limited for some groups, especially lower-middle
income households attempting to move from social housing into home ownership.
Because of the practice of site-specific planning via direct negotiations, my attempts to
illuminate a generalizable relationship between land values and development densities
were inconclusive.
Generally speaking, the experts I interviewed were supportive of the objectives
of growth management policy in the Netherlands. Planners portrayed spatial planning
as a reflection of widely-shared cultural values and spoke of universal support for
open space preservation, while also acknowledging some costs associated with growth
management. For their part, the economists I encountered tended to emphasize the
dominance of public policy and the institutions of governance over market forces.
Because of that dominance, economists generally rejected the application of strict
neoclassical models to the highly regulated land and housing markets of the
Netherlands. The preferred stock adjustment model of housing markets minimizes the
impact of land supply on aggregate housing costs and, by extension, undermines the
most common neoclassical critiques of regulatory growth management policy.
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While some respondents criticized the planning system for excessive
regulations and procedural hurdles, suggestions for policy reform were generally
limited in scope and scale. Calls for broad-scale deregulation of land and housing
markets were not common amongst the experts I interviewed.

Reflections and Suggestions for Future Research
In this case study, I have outlined the historical and geographical context of
Dutch spatial planning, describing the evolution of growth management policy since
the second world war. Based on findings from interviews with 19 experts in the field, I
have described the perspectives of Dutch spatial planners, civil servants, and
academics with respect to current issues of growth management, housing
development, and housing affordability. I have contextualized the responses of my
interview subjects by comparing my findings to the American literature on growth
management, identifying areas of overlap and discord between the multiple
perspectives presented. I have also highlighted contributions offered by my
respondents which struck me as particularly new and interesting, such as the tendency
for landowners to organize scarcity, the practice of conceptualizing housing markets
using a stock adjustment model, and the economic argument against large-scale land
release. Above all, I have attempted to accurately convey the complex and
multifaceted accounts I heard when I sat down to interview experts on Dutch spatial
planning.
The Netherlands has often been called a “planner’s paradise,” and with good
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reason. The Dutch system of spatial planning combines strong regulatory approaches,
active public development, cross-sectoral negotiations and cooperation, and ambitious
urban design. For foreign planners and scholars of urban policy, the result is a research
context brimming with complexity, unanswered questions, and enticing examples of
an extremely active planning tradition. The primary contribution of this case study is
its description of the Dutch planning approach in terms familiar to scholars of
American growth management. By focusing on issues of developable land supply,
housing supply, and housing affordability, I have examined Dutch approaches to some
of the biggest challenges faced by proponents of effective and equitable growth
management. The resulting description is not simple, neat, or complete. I hope that, at
the very least, it is interesting to scholars of American planning, who might have the
opportunity to consider familiar subjects through an intriguing foreign lens.
This research has significant limitations, and leaves a number of important
issues unresolved. The description of national policy objectives and broad historical
developments offered here does not fully satisfy my original curiosity regarding
growth management policy tools and planning approaches employed at the municipal
level. Current efforts to combine affordable housing and compact development
policies receive scant coverage in this case study. And specific issues of concern, such
as the relationship between land cost and development density, are only partially
explored. These omissions are due, in part, to a simple lack of the time and expertise
needed to effectively gather data on policy efforts occurring at multiple levels of
government. Moreover, the Dutch practice of planning through negotiations conducted
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at the level of individual developments presents significant challenges to the
researcher aiming to understand policymaking and planning practice at the municipal
level.
To confront these challenges, future researchers interested in pursuing the issues
discussed here would be wise to consider a focused, “bottom up” approach. In
specific, I would suggest beginning with a particular plan or development of interest,
and working to gain access to the key stakeholders involved. Depending on the degree
of access allowed, the planning, permitting and development processes could then be
followed throughout the life of a project, augmented by interviews with central
players. This would give the researcher access to the “real work” of Dutch planning
via negotiation and collaboration, and would shed light on the institutional and
interpersonal relationships that define the process. Informed by this observational
research, a broader analysis could then be pursued.
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1

For maps displaying the basic topography and land use of the Netherlands, see
Appendix B.
2
See Appendix A.
3
See Anthony 2006, p 123-124, for an elaboration on this criticism. For a discussion
of the underlying economic theory, see Fischel 1989 and 2004.
4
For a review and discussion of variables at the intersection of land and housing
markets, see: Adams, Watkins and White, eds. 2005; Adams and Watkins 2002.
5
The term “urban containment” denotes a subset of growth management policies.
According to Nelson and Dawkins (2004), the fundamental purposes of urban
containment are: (1) to promote compact and contiguous development patterns that
can be efficiently served by public services and (2) to preserve open space,
agricultural land, and environmentally sensitive areas that are not currently suitable for
urban development (Nelson and Dawkins, 2004). These objectives are central to the
policies underlying Dutch growth management (Faludi and van der Valk, 1994).
6
Case study questions are distinct from interview questions posed directly to subjects.
For an example of interview questions, see Appendix B.
7
For a full discussion of these powers, see Needham 2007, 142-146.
8
As a portion of total predevelopment costs, the combination of land preparation and
primary servicing (i.e. the provision of basic infrastructure) often equals or exceeds
the cost of land acquisition. In a study of ten large-scale VINEX locations, the
Kolpron research institute (2000) found that land acquisition costs averaged 38% of
predevelopment costs, while land preparation and primary servicing combined
averaged 42% of predevelopment costs (see Priemus and Louw 2002, 130). In the case
of smaller developments, which enjoy reduced economies of scale, land preparation
and primary servicing can combine to exceed 50% of total predevelopment costs. For
a full description of the land preparation process, see Korthals Altes 2008, 8-9.
9
Municipal influence over land prices operates within certain legal limits. See:
Needham 2007, 185-186.
10
This assumes a cooperative relationship between national and municipal planning
departments, via the intermediary provincial government. For a discussion of the
complexities of inter-governmental relations and their effects on spatial planning, see
Needham 2007, and Faludi 1994.
11
For a map of the Randstad, see Appendix E.
12
In fact, maps circulated with early drafts of the VINEX report displayed future
“development directions” in detail (Needham 2007, 193).
13
Because these shifts often entail more capital-intensive forms of development (e.g.
steel structures, elevators, enhanced foundations), capital is substituted for land, hence
the term “factor substitution.”
14
It should be noted that much of this oversupply is absorbed by higher-income
households living in social housing units. Having gained access to the social housing
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system through means testing, tenants cannot legally be forced out if household
income rises above the entry threshold. Thus, a significant portion of the social
housing stock is occupied by higher-income households. This is a well-documented
and much-discussed feature of the social housing market.
15
For a detailed description of demand-side subsidies, see Priemus 1998.
16
For further discussion of these theoretical issues, see Adams et al 2005, 24-25.
17
For discussions of policy reform, see Boelhouwer 2005, Boelhouwer et al 2006,
Renes et al 2006.
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APPENDIX A: BENGSTON, ET AL (2004) GROWTH
MANAGEMENT TYPOLOGY
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APPENDIX B: BASIC TOPOGRAPHY AND LAND USE OF
THE NETHERLANDS

Comparing the two maps,
note the highly urbanized
area stretched along the
country’s west coast, where
most land lies below sea
level.
Source: Ministry of
Housing, Spatial Planning
and the Environment, pp 67 (2006).
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APPENDIX C: EXAMPLE INTERVIEW SCRIPT
Subject: Koos van Zanen, Housing Specialist - Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening (Department of
Spatial Planning), Municipality of Amsterdam
Getting Started
•
•
•
•
•

THANK YOU
Cover letter
OK to record?
o On/off record issues
How much time?
In Dutch, is it “day-er-oh”?

Background and Position at DRO
•
•
•

Tell me a bit about your training and career path?
Tell me a bit about your work at the DRO?
Aside from your (department/position) within the DRO, is there a separate housing
agency at the municipality?
o If Yes: How closely do you work with that department?
o If No: Do you do a lot of work directly with private developers and social
housing corporations?

Background on my research...
•
•
•
•
•
•

Share 2040 GC Map
Portland, Oregon uses an Urban Growth Boundary to contain low-density sprawl
Portland also has a tradition of strong, pro-active planning on a regional scale
There are concerns in the region about the containment of land supply and the effects
on housing costs
At the same time: opportunities to counteract land market inflation via the planning
system
MY INTEREST: Plans/policies/practices utilized in Amsterdam to maintain adequate
housing supply and access to affordable housing...within a context of concentrated
development

Regulatory Issues
I’d like to start by asking you about the tools used to contain and concentrate development in
Amsterdam.
• I’m familiar with national policies regarding the designation of red and green
contours.
o Can you tell me about the process of determining red and green contours in
Amsterdam?
o Which levels of government are directly involved?
o Are there competing interests in the process?

107

•
•

•

o How often are contour plans revised?
Is it fair to say that red/green contours have a significant containment effect on the
supply of land available for development?
Are there other important planning tools utilized to contain the supply of land
available for development?
o Green heart policies?
o Ecological main zones?
o Other?
When those tools are taken together, do you see the supply of land available for
development as relatively fixed…or is it in flux?

Monitoring Issues
I’m interested in the ways that land markets might be monitored.
• Are there systems in place to monitor the supply of land available for development?
o Is that information stored in a database?
o How current is the data?
o How is it maintained/updated?
• Can you tell me about the reasons for (not) monitoring land supply?
• Can you give me some specific examples of how that data is put to use?
I’m also interested in the ways that housing markets might be monitored.
• Is the cost of housing, or access to housing, something that the DRO monitors?
o Is that information stored in a database?
o How current is the data?
o How is it maintained/updated?
• Can you tell me about the reasons for (not) monitoring housing costs?
• Can you give me some specific examples of how that data is put to use?
Planning Action
•

•

Is the affordability of housing an issue that falls under DRO’s area of responsibility?
o If so: what parts of the department are tasked with housing affordability
issues?
o If not: does DRO have any responsibility for this issue?
Could you tell me about the work done within DRO to affect affordability?
o What are the most important planning tools used to affect affordability?
 Direct or indirect approach?
• Regulatory?
• Incentive-based?
• Direct subsidies?
• Advisory?
• Capacity building?
o Are there important partner organizations/departments in the DRO’s work on
affordability issues?
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I’d like to ask about a specific aspect of planning that is particularly important in the US
context, and that is the density of new housing development.
•
•

Is there much variation in housing density levels in Amsterdam…or is the market
fairly uniform in that respect?
Is housing density an issue that the DRO seeks to influence?
o If not: why not?
 Is this left up to markets?
 Or to another public agency?
o If so: what tools/approaches are used to influence density?
• Regulatory?
• Incentive-based?
• Direct subsidies?
• Advisory?
• Capacity building?

In the Portland context, increasing housing density is seen as an important way to offset
increased land prices due to supply regulations.
• Are density issues seen in the same way in Amsterdam, or at the DRO?
o If not: why not?
Land Economics
Finally, I’d like to ask about the broader issues of land economics that have been running
throughout this conversation.
In Portland, where we directly regulate the supply of land available for development, it is
generally agreed that this action increases the cost of land within the boundary. Now, there is
some debate about how that relates to the cost of housing. But there is agreement about
increasing the cost of land available for development.
• Is this an issue that is discussed in Amsterdam?
• Would you say that there is general agreement that constraining land supply increases
the cost of land?
• If this is debated:
o Could you tell me a bit about the different positions in that debate?
o Are there specific interest groups associated with either position?
• In planning/policy circles, is there a direct link made between urban containment and
housing affordability policies?
o Which parts of the municipal government are responsible for
understanding/managing that link?
o What steps are taken if/when land supply is thought to be driving up the cost
of housing?
Conclusion
•

Is there anything else you think I might be interested in?
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS AND DATES
Name

Position Title

Blom,
Floris

Senior Policy
Advisor

Dubbeldam, Senior
Frans
Planner

Organization (Dutch) Organization
(English)
Dienst Wonen,
Housing
Gemeente Amsterdam Department,
Municipality of
Amsterdam
Dienst Ruimtelijke
Spatial Planning
Ordening, Gemeente
Department,
Amsterdam
Municipality of
Amsterdam
AEDES
Association of
Housing
Corporations
Ontwikkelingsbedrijf, Land Development
Gemeente Amsterdam Department,
Municipality of
Amsterdam
Provincie NoordProvince of North
Holland
Holland

Georgius,
Maarten

Project
Manager

Haaker,
Anja

Financial
Specialist

Klopper,
Nils

Policy
Analyst

Korthals
Altes,
Willem K.

Professor,
GeoInformation
and Land
Development
Financial
Specialist

Technische
Universiteit Delft

Delft University of
Technology

Ontwikkelingsbedrijf,
Gemeente Amsterdam

Needham,
Barrie

Professor of
Spatial
Planning

Radboud Universiteit
Nijmegen

Land Development
Department,
Municipality of
Amsterdam
University of
Nijmegen

Nip,
Maarten

Regional
Planner

Stadsregio Amsterdam City Region of
Amsterdam

Ploeger,
Ralph

Senior
Housing
Advisor

Ontwikkelingsbedrijf,
Gemeente Amsterdam

Renes,
Gusta

Senior
Researcher

Ruimtelijk Planbureau
(RPB)

Maljers,
Frank
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Date
Apr 29,
2008

Jun 16,
2008

Mar 4,
2008
May
28,
2008
May
27,
2008
Apr 15,
2008

May
28,
2008
Mar 13,
2008;
Jun 11,
2008
May
21,
2008
Apr 22,
2008

Land Development
Department,
Municipality of
Amsterdam
Netherlands Bureau Apr 28,
of Spatial Planning 2008

Santen,
Joline
Schuiling,
Dick

van der
Burg, Arjen

Policy
Advisor
Professor of
Spatial
Planning and
Housing
Policy
Senior
Strategy
Expert

van der
Post,
Willem

Guest
Lecturer; PhD
Candidate

van der
Valk,
Arnold
van Dijk,
Terry

Professor of
Land Use
Planning
Assistant
Professor of
Land Use
Planning
Senior
Planner

van Zanen,
Koos

Vermeulen,
Wouter

Researcher

Provincie NoordHolland
Universiteit van
Amsterdam

Province of North
Holland
University of
Amsterdam

May 7,
2008
May
19,
2008

Ministerie van
Volkshuisvesting,
Ruimtelijke Ordening
en Milieu (VROM)
Universiteit van
Amsterdam;
Amsterdam School of
Real Estate
Wageningen
University

Ministry of
Housing, Spatial
Planning and the
Environment
University of
Amsterdam;
Amsterdam School
of Real Estate
Wageningen
University

Feb 28,
2008

Universiteit van
Groningen

University of
Groningen

Jun 17,
2008

Dienst Ruimtelijke
Ordening, Gemeente
Amsterdam

Spatial Planning
Department,
Municipality of
Amsterdam
Netherlands Bureau
for Economic
Policy Analysis;
Free University

Mar 11,
2008

Centraal Planbureau;
Vrije Universiteit
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Apr 23,
2008

Jun 5,
2008

Jun 26,
2008

APPENDIX E: MAP OF THE RANDSTAD

The Randstad conurbation (Area 1, above) includes the cities of Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht. In total, the Randstad is home to 7.5 million of the
nation’s 16.5 million people. Source: Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment, pp 19 (2006).
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